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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we undertake a comparative study of the development paths of Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa since the 1960s applying the classical framework of Arthur Lewis’s 1954 paper 
on economic development with unlimited supplies of labour.  We will try to show that the 
classical framework used by Lewis can provide powerful insights into the comparative 
development trajectories in the two continents with useful policy lessons – much of which has 
been lost to the literature that has evolved on this subject since the 1980s.  As pointed out by 
Lewis, with the assumption of unlimited supply of labour in the classical system, attention is 
focused on enquiring how the system expands over time, with income distribution, capital 
accumulation and growth taking the centre stage, and relative prices of commodities 
determined as a by product.  With the ascendancy of neo-classical thought in development 
economics since the 1980s, however, relative prices and market efficiency have taken the 
centre stage, and capital accumulation and the expansion of the system have become minor by 
products believed to be brought about by the working of efficient markets.  This has also 
significantly influenced the recent literature on comparative growth of Asia and Africa.   
In the next section we begin by a brief overview of the recent literature on comparative 
development of Asia and Africa. We argue that much of this literature has been preoccupied 
with identifying government policy differences as the main explanatory factors, to the neglect 
of the differences in economic structures between the two regions which shape government 
policy and its outcomes.  It is in relation to these structural differences that the classical 
framework of the Lewis model can act as a powerful analytical tool.  Since the key concept in 
the Lewis model is that of surplus labour, in Section 3 we compare Asia and Africa in terms of 
their proximity to the surplus labour economy depicted by Lewis.  We show that although Asia 
seems to fit the surplus labour economy model, both in terms of its structures and development 
patterns, the sub-Saharan African economies in the wake of their independence were by and 
large labour constrained economies.  Given that the major part of the population in both 
regions in the 1960s lived in rural areas and were engaged in agricultural and related activities, 
we argue that the key factors affecting surplus labour conditions in the two regions emanated 
from the production conditions in agriculture.  The implications of the differences between the 
agrarian systems in the two regions, in terms of development patterns and policy options are 
discussed in the following three sections.  In Section 4 we discuss the development options and 
policy constraints in sub-Saharan African type economies with limited supply of labour, with 
particular reference to agricultural transformation and development of infrastructure.  The 
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implications for the apparent duality of the sub-Saharan African economies and the urban bias 
hypothesis are discussed in Section 5.  In Section 6 we discuss the implications for financing of 
accumulation, and concluding remarks are made in Section 7.    
 
2.  Recent Debates on Comparative Growth of Asia and Africa 
The recent literature on comparative development of Asia and Africa has been dominated by 
debates on structural adjustment policies by the World Bank and its critics.  As a result, the 
main focus of much of the literature has been on policy differences between the two regions 
and their supposed implications.  The early studies of the success of Asian industrialization by 
the World Bank were aimed at drawing lessons from the Asian experience, which normally 
took the form of highlighting the virtues of free markets, liberalized trade regimes and state 
non-intervention in economic development.  This later took the form of prescriptive advice for 
the African economic malaise which was said to have been caused by pursuing interventionist 
policies contrary to neo-classical notions of market efficiency and policies highlighted in the 
World Bank studies of the Asian experience (see, e.g. World Bank 1981, 1986, and Meier and 
Steel, 1987).  Much of the literature which developed in this period as a critique of the World 
Bank position was concerned with demonstrating that the experience of the Asian miracle 
economies was indeed far from the non-interventionist approach highlighted in the World 
Bank studies (see, e.g., Amsden 1989 and Wade 1990).  As yet little attention was paid to the 
question of the conditions of possibility of transferring development strategies and policies 
from one country to another, let alone the possibility for such a transfer at the continental level. 
More recent work seems to be taking the question of ‘reproducibility’ of country experiences 
more seriously.  For example, the World Bank’s realization that economic policies, 
notwithstanding their intrinsic merits, will not be effectively implemented if there are not 
‘owned’ by the country in question is a belated recognition of the ‘reproducibility’ question.  
Others have addressed the issue of reproducibility of policies in the specific context of the 
Asian and African development experiences (see, e.g., Stein, 1994, 1995, Laurence and Thirtle 
2001).  For example, Stein (1995a) identifies a number of factors that, according to the 
findings of the studies in his edited volume, complicate the implementation of the Asian type 
industrialization policies in Africa – e.g. the absence of appropriate political alliances and 
structures of governance, backward social and economic infrastructure, absence of appropriate 
cultural and social norms, etc.   
In this paper we argue that the separation of the issue of identification of policies pursued in 
Asia and the question of reproducibility of such policies in the context of Africa is not 
illuminating and can result in superficial and misleading policy conclusions.  To begin with, 
we note that politics in general and economic policy in particular are country specific issues 
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and are best analysed in the context of individual country comparisons (preferably in countries 
with similar economic structures) rather than continent or region wide comparisons.  It would 
be implausible to assume that most countries in one region have adopted the right policies and 
those in the other region adopted the wrong policies simply because of their geographical 
location.  In order to explain general tendencies at the regional level it would be perhaps more 
plausible to start from the shared structural features of the economies in question rather than 
making overgeneralizations about political tendencies and policy choices at a regional level.  
And it is with regard to such shared structural features of the economies in the two continents 
that the Lewis model acts as a powerful tool of analysis.  Since surplus labour is the central 
element of the Lewis model, we may start by asking to what extent the Asian and African 
economies have exhibited traits which conform with the surplus labour hypothesis.    
 
3.  Agrarian Structures in Asia and Africa and the Surplus Labour Hypothesis 
According to Lewis (1954), the condition of unlimited supply of labour does not necessarily 
apply to all the developing countries.  He explicitly pointed out that a large part of Africa and 
Latin America did not seem to fulfil this condition.  As a general regional attribute he only 
referred to Asia as characterized by surplus labour, and Egypt was the only country in the 
African continent which he explicitly mentioned as an economy with possibly unlimited 
supplies of labour.  With historical hindsight we can now use the data on economic 
development in Asia and Africa over the four decades since the 1960s to examine how closely 
these countries follow the surplus labour model. 
Since the publication of Lewis’s paper, a large body of theoretical and empirical literature has 
appeared on the microeconomic underpinnings of the surplus labour hypothesis.  As our main 
focus in this paper is on broad comparative regional indicators, we shall not delve into the 
definitional intricacies of the microeconomic debate.  Instead we introduce a concept of surplus 
labour economy which retains the essence of the Lewis model and at the same time can be 
made operational for the purpose of cross country comparisons.  For our purposes a surplus 
labour economy is defined as one where a major part of the labour force with little or no access 
to means of production, particularly land, is engaged in low productivity jobs, mainly taking 
the form of casual wage labour, and is prepared to offer its labour services for relatively low 
wages close to subsistence levels.  This reserve army of labour is large, and reproduces itself at 
a sufficient rate such that it can provide an elastic supply of wage labour to a rapidly growing 
high productivity capitalist sector for a long span of time.   With the growth of the high 
productivity, modern capitalist sector, the overall productivity of labour in the economy 
increases, but because of the surplus labour condition the product wages in the capitalist sector 
remain fixed or increase at much lower rates than the rate of productivity growth of the newly 
employed labour.  This forms the basis for an increasing savings surplus in the form of profits 
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in the capitalist sector, which can fuel capital accumulation and self sustained expansion of the 
economy.  There are other details such as sectoral balances and necessary structural changes in 
this process which can be discussed in the context of concrete empirical experiences of 
countries in the following sections. 
The history of sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas during the colonial times, where one of 
the defining characteristics of colonial policy was to deal with labour shortages, shows how far 
these two continents were in those days from the surplus labour paradigm sketched above.  Our 
concern here, however, is to assess the surplus labour condition in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa 
during the more recent past.  For this purpose we compare twenty-eight countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with ten countries in Asia since the 1960s, which is the earliest decade in the 
post-colonial period where systematic data for the countries concerned are available.  The 
countries included in this study, listed in Table 1, comprise the majority of the population in 
the two continents.  As Table 1 shows, in the mid-1960s Asian countries were on average more 
industrialized than sub-Saharan Africa, as indicated by their respective shares of employment 
in the industrial and services sectors.  However, in both regions over 80 per cent of the 
population in the mid-1960s were still in the rural sector, mostly engaged in agricultural 
activities.  There are of course exceptions in both continents, e.g., South Africa in sub-Saharan 
Africa and to some extent Korea in Asia, where both countries exhibit more advanced 
employment structures than the regional averages.  We shall show particular attention to such 
exceptions as we proceed, because they show the possible future trajectories of development in 
their respective continents.  But the concentration of employment in the rural areas and 
predominantly in agricultural activities in both regions in the early 1960s clearly indicates that 
the conditions of the existence of surplus labour in both regions should be investigated first and 
foremost in relation to the characteristics of their respective agrarian systems.   
An important contrast between the Asian and the Sub-Saharan African agriculture is the much 
higher population pressure on land in Asia as compared to Africa.  This is reflected in the data 
in the first two columns of Table 2, which show labour/land ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia for 1965 and 1994.  As can be seen, the number of labourers per hectare of agricultural 
land was on average five times higher in Asia than in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1965.  This of 
course does not mean that the agricultural population in Africa are uniformly spread across 
wide tracts of agricultural land.  As can be seen in the third column of the table, on average 
only about 16 per cent of the agricultural land in the sample countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the mid-1960s is cultivated land.  The rest is composed of pastures which is partly used for 
herding and hunting gathering, and partly unutilized.  This does not mean that all or even most 
of the remaining pastures are readily cultivable, or suitable for cultivation at all1.  The figures 
nevertheless help to delineate the difference in the predominant systems of farming in the two 
                                                 
1 For a detailed discussion of the various degrees of suitability of agricultural land for cultivation in different Sub-Saharan 
African countries see, FAO, 1986. 
4
regions; namely, extensive farming in Sub-Saharan Africa where smallholder agriculture is 
based on shifting cultivation and where the main constraint to output expansion is labour and 
labour augmenting technological possibilities, and intensive farming in Asia where land, and 
land augmenting technological possibilities, form the main constraints to growth.  This is 
further reflected in the patterns of investment and input use in the agricultural sectors in the 
two continents. 
In Asia, where most countries had already reached the limits of agricultural land frontiers in the 
1960s, and with enormous population pressure on land, agricultural growth has been based on 
land augmenting but labour intensive seed/fertilizer technology of the green revolution and 
multiple cropping methods.  This is reflected in high rates of fertilizer use and irrigation in 
Asia in contrast to Sub-Saharan Africa, as shown in Table 3.  As can be seen, already in 1965 
average irrigation rate in Asia was fifty times higher, and fertilizer use was more than ten times 
higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Tractor use, which is a relatively more labour saving than 
land augmenting device, was on the other hand more or less at par between the two regions in 
1965.  These input-use ratios, of course, should not be viewed as fixed technological 
coefficients appropriate to given systems of farming.  There is for example no reason why 
extensive farming cannot benefit from higher fertilizer use, or irrigation, which can increase 
productivity of both land and labour.  The example of extensive farming in the highly 
capitalized South African agriculture with much higher fertilizer use than African average is a 
case in point (Table 3).  The low input use ratios for Sub-Saharan Africa are therefore also 
indications of low investment and undercapitalization of agriculture in the region.  This is 
highlighted by the rapidly widening gap in input use (whether of the seed/fertilizer type or 
tractors and machinery) between Asia and Africa during the 1965-94 period (Table 3), which 
also explains the significant differences in agricultural labour productivity growth rates 
between the two regions which will be discussed below.  Of course, investment growth in 
agriculture itself depends, amongst other things, on the availability of new productive 
technologies which can help maintain the profitability of investment in the sector.    
The above picture is in conformity with the basic stylized facts about the technological level of 
Sub-Saharan African agriculture discussed in the literature, namely that with a few exceptions 
it predominantly consists of subsistence farmers using simple technologies and with little use 
of modern inputs.  It would be, however, wrong to conclude on this basis that the level of 
labour productivity in the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African agriculture was much lower than 
in Asia.  It would be certainly plausible to assume that land productivity in extensive 
agriculture of Sub-Saharan African type would be lower than intensive farming in Asia, but the 
same does not hold for labour productivity because lower yields can be compensated by higher 
land/labour ratios.  This was indeed the case, as can be seen from Table 4 which shows land 
and labour productivity in the sample countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia in comparable 
(wheat equivalent) units.  As shown in the table, in 1965 median land productivity in Asia was 
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eight times higher than the median for Sub-Saharan Africa, but labour productivity levels in the 
two regions were not significantly different.  In fact labour productivity levels in most African 
countries in 1965 were higher than the least developed countries in Asia such as Bangladesh, 
China, India, and Indonesia.  Of course in the subsequent period, with the much higher rates of 
productivity growth in Asia, the labour productivity gap between the two regions widens 
rapidly (Table 4).   
Some of the other differences in the agricultural systems in Asia and Africa are also related to 
their differences in population pressure on land.  A fundamental aspect of such differences in 
the two agricultural systems pertains to the prevailing relations of production, namely, the 
patterns of ownership and control of land and other productive assets, and organization of 
labour, in the two regions.  Asian agriculture, given its high population density, by and large 
consists of highly differentiated peasant ownership structures, with a large part of the 
agricultural labour force taking the form of landless labourers or poor peasant farmers with the 
major part of their livelihood taking the form of wage income.  Rural wages in these economies 
are well below the average product of labour.  The post-colonial land abundant Sub-Saharan 
economies on the other hand have more limited development of wage labour in agricultural 
production.  Possession of agricultural land by individual farmers has been predominantly 
through some kind of communal arrangement or traditional customary rights, with family 
labour being the predominant form of agricultural labour.  The lack of development of wage 
labour has been due to the ease of access to the main productive asset in agriculture, namely 
land.   
Though other derivative institutional aspects of Sub-Saharan African agriculture, such as lack 
of development of financial markets, obviously have important implications for the 
development of these economies, the absence of a landless wage labouring class is of 
fundamental importance to the surplus labour hypothesis2.  In Asia, the non-agricultural sectors 
have had access to an abundant supply of wage labour at wage rates which are a fraction of the 
average product of labour in agriculture, and with relatively elastic supply.  In Sub-Saharan 
Africa on the other hand, the opportunity cost of labour or the reservation wage for the non-
agricultural sector is close to the average product of labour in agriculture.  This is because 
under the institutional arrangements of Sub-Saharan African agriculture the individual farmer 
appropriates the total product and the rental market for agricultural land is undeveloped3.  This 
                                                 
2  The above characterization of predominant agrarian relations in Sub-Saharan Africa is based on Binswanger and McIntire, 
1987, and Hayami and Platteau 1997.  This is of course an oversimplified stylized picture which does not apply to all parts of 
Sub-Sahara or even to all parts of any individual country in the region.  The picture has been also changing very rapidly with 
fast rates of population growth.  However, as a stylized characterization of Sub-Saharan smallholder agriculture in the 
immediate post-colonial period, and in contrast to Asian agriculture, this may be a permissible generalization. 
3 There is of course an implicit rental value, for example when the remaining members of the family keep working on the land 
when the head of the household migrates.  When land is relatively abundant, however, the marginal product of the migrant 
worker is likely to be close to average product of labour.  This is in fact supported by the available evidence in the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  According to the evidence reviewed in Delgado and Ranade (1987), the marginal product of labour in Sub-
Saharan Africa seems to be very close to the average product, in contrast to Asia where marginal product of labour is well 
below average product.  The same is also suggested by Delgado and Mellor (1984, p.667), who believe that the output 
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can imply a substantial differential in the two regions in non-agricultural wages relative to 
average productivity in agriculture.   
Before looking at the actual wage differences between the two regions, it would be helpful to 
form some approximate idea about the orders of magnitude of implied wage differences 
involved.  According to estimates by Mellor and Ranade quoted in Delgado and Ranade 
(1987), the share of labour in agriculture in Maharashtra (India) was 15 per cent.  Of course 
there are variations in factor shares across different regions in India, as there are across 
different countries in Asia4.  But even if we assume a labour share as high as 50 per cent on 
average in Asian agriculture, and also considering that average labour productivities in the 
agricultural sectors in the two regions in 1965 were more or less equal, the above argument 
implies a non-agricultural wage rate in Sub-Saharan Africa which is at least 100 per cent 
higher than Asia.  With a less conservative, but perhaps more realistic, assumption of wage 
rates in Asian surplus labour agriculture being 30 per cent of the average product of labour, and 
in Africa 90 per cent, the reservation wages for African non-agricultural sector would be 3 
times higher than Asia in 1965.  These are of course very inexact estimates, but they 
nevertheless provide an idea of the plausible ranges of the orders of magnitude involved.  It 
would be instructive to compare these with some of the available evidence on wage 
differentials between Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Table 5 shows wages in manufacturing sector in our sample countries in Asia and Africa.  
Wage rates are calculated as total compensation of labour divided by the number of workers.  
The first broad column in the table shows wage rates in US dollars converted at official 
exchange rates.  As can be seen, during the latter half of the 1960s, wages in Sub-Saharan 
countries for which data are available, were on average more than 90 per cent higher than in 
Asia.  Despite the considerable variations within regions, the average for Africa is significantly 
more than Asia.  During the 1970s the wage gap between the two regions widens considerably 
before it narrows down sharply in the 1980s.  These figures, evaluated at official exchange 
rates, are not of course appropriate indicators of the variations of wages in real purchasing 
power terms across countries, or over time5.  The second broad column of the table shows 
consumption wages in international purchasing power terms in different countries.  When 
valued in purchasing power parity terms the median wage gap between the two regions during 
the 1970s considerably narrows down to the same order of magnitude as in the 1965-70 period, 
                                                                                                                                                          
elasticity with respect to labour in Sub-Saharan Africa is close to 1.  My own estimates, based on a cross-section estimation of 
production function for 1965 using the data in Tables 3 and 4, also confirmed these points.  A linear production function shows 
output elasticity, evaluated at mean, of 1.05, and a log-linear function gives estimates of 0.86. 
4 Maharashtra in fact has one of the lowest population land ratios amongst Indian states.  As shown in Table 14, India’s 
labour/land ratio is close to the median in Asia. 
5 Considerable government controls, and the misalignment of the official exchange rates relative to the market exchange rates, 
are only part of the reasons for this.  Even under free trade and free market exchange rates, relative prices across countries 
would systematically vary with their level of development and with the structure of their economies.  In Sub-Saharan type 
economies for example prices are expected to be higher relative to Asian economies. 
7
and by the late 1980s the wage gap almost vanishes.  While comparable across the countries, 
these figures are not appropriate indicators of real wage changes over time.  The third broad 
column of Table 5 shows the real wage indices (deflated by domestic consumer price index), 
which indicate the movement of real wages in different sample countries over time.  As can be 
seen, wage increases in Africa during the 1970s were not on average different from those of 
Asia, and during the 1980s recession real wages in Africa witnessed a precipitous decline. 
These wage differentials, which are in line with other evidence on wages in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, highlight a number of important points6.  Firstly, the average wage differentials in the 
1960s were not higher than the expected ranges derived from a priori reasoning above, based 
on the agrarian structures agricultural productivities in the two regions.  Secondly, the 1960s 
wage differentials and the movement of wages in the subsequent period do not support the 
commonly held view that the power of labour unions or urban interest groups were the main 
reasons for wage differential between the two regions.  In fact real wages in the recessionary 
period of the 1980s is Sub-Saharan Africa have shown remarkable flexibility7.  Wage rates in 
sub-Saharan Africa moved relatively in line with the overall per worker GDP during the 
growth period up to the early 1980s, but showed a sharp decline both in absolute terms and 
relative to per worker GDP during the recessionary period of the 1980s.  The rapid decline in 
real wages and their falling behind the growth of GDP per worker from the inception of the 
recession does not seem to be in line with the urban interest group theory, but it is very much 
in tune with the labour shortage hypothesis suggested above.  Once we take into account the 
differences in agrarian conditions in the two regions, it appears that in order to explain the 
wage differentials between Asia and Africa one does not need to invoke arguments about 
government wage legislation or union power in the post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.  
With high rates of unemployment and underemployment of labour currently visible in urban 
centres in most Sub-Saharan African economies, and the fast rates of population growth which 
are putting increasing pressure on fragile soils in African agriculture, to refer to these 
economies as labour constrained economies may appear paradoxical.  Labour constraints, 
however, are best highlighted in the context of resource requirements for sustained growth 
rather than the current state of employment in the crisis ridden African urban economies. This 
could be best seen in relation to the historical experience of growth in post-colonial Sub-
Saharan Africa in comparison to surplus labour economies in Asia.  One instructive 
comparison is the episode of rapid growth during the 1970s in Nigeria, the most populous 
country in Sub-Saharan Africa, with that of Indonesia in the Far East.  The two countries are 
oil-exporting economies of similar sizes, but with the difference that Indonesian agriculture has 
                                                 
6 Some of the existing evidence is briefly reviewed in Teranishi (1987). 
7 For a more detailed discussion of this point, using a larger sample of developing countries, see, Karshenas (1997).  The 
behaviour of wages in Africa shows considerable flexibility compared to, for example, the behaviour of wages in Latin 
America during the 1980s recession. 
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labour/land ratios which are three times that of Nigeria (see, Table 4).  The prevalence of 
shifting cultivation which is still the predominant form of smallholder agricultural production 
in Nigeria, and the fact that according to available estimates cultivated land in Nigeria can be 
doubled with the prevailing techniques pending the availability of labour, signify the labour 
constrained nature of Nigerian agriculture8.   It is not surprising that the oil boom of the 1970s, 
which led to a rapid growth of investment in Nigerian economy, induced a substantial increase 
in real wages in rural areas and an inflow of millions of immigrant labourers from 
neighbouring countries9.  On the other hand, the surplus labour economy of Indonesia, 
throughout a long period of rapid and sustained economic growth during the 1970s and the 
1980s, has shown moderate increases in real wages and has remained a net labour exporting 
country10.  
This phenomenon can also be seen at a more general regional level, by examining the trends in 
real wages and GDP per worker in the two regions shown in Figure 1.  The two variables are 
measured as simple averages of the indices of real GDP per worker and real manufacturing 
wages (deflated by consumer price index) for the countries in the two regions, as listed in 
Table 5.  There are of course considerable variations in individual country experiences within 
each region which necessitate extra care in making generalizations on the basis of simple 
regional averages shown in the figure.  The contrasting regional trends shown by the graphs are 
nevertheless representative of the experience of many, if not all, the countries in the two 
respective regions.   
As can be seen from the top graph, in Sub-Saharan Africa during the growth period of 1965-80 
real wages grow more or less in line with the growth of labour productivity, and it is only 
during the slowdown of the 1980s and the deep recession in the non-agricultural urban 
economy that wages fall behind GDP per worker trends.  In Asia on the other hand 
productivity growth surges ahead of real wage growth throughout a long period of rapid and 
sustained economic growth.  The behaviour of real wage/productivity trends in Asia has a 
remarkable similarity to the trends envisioned by the surplus labour economy model of Lewis 
(1954).  The existence of surplus labour in Asian agriculture has been part of the reason for the 
possibility of generation of the wage/productivity trends seen in Figure 1.  The other part has 
                                                 
8  See, e.g., Oyejide (1986) and sources quoted there. 
9 Rural wages in real terms increased by more than 170 per cent in Nigeria between 1970 and 1980.  The exact figures for 
immigrant labour in Nigeria during the 1970s is not available.  However, according to Adepoju (1994), it is estimated that with 
the collapse of the growth process in the 1980s about 1.5 million immigrant workers were expelled from Nigeria, which gives 
some indication of the scale of labour immigration. 
10  On labour migration in Indonesia and other Pacific Asian countries see, Fong (1993).  A number of authors have attributed 
the difference in growth performance of the two countries in the post oil boom period to the differences in their 
macroeconomic polocies and particularly their exchange rate policies.  Though macroeconomic policy, in particular 
government expenditure policy in oil exporting countries is of utmost importance, in labour constrained economies such as 
Nigeria the real exchange rate becomes endogenous once government expenditure policy is given.  The rise in real wages and 
the apparent overvaluation of the real exchange rate in such economies is an inevitable result of the investment boom in the 
face of labour shortages.  This is not necessarily the case in surplus labour economies such as Indonesia.  
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been the ability of agriculture, through investment and a constant introduction of new 
technologies, to provide cheap food and raw materials necessary for the growth of employment 
in other sectors and for the feeding of a growing population in general.  Without this latter 
condition being met, the growth of employment, output, and productivity in the economy 
would be choked in early stages by increasing food prices and erosion of investable surpluses 
in the rest of the economy.  The African wage/productivity path during its growth period of 
1965-80, shown in the graph, is due to the fact that one or the other, and in the majority of 
cases both, of these conditions failed to be met in a large part of that continent. 
The fact that the reservation wage in non-agricultural sector in post-colonial Sub-Saharan 
Africa was close to the average product of labour in agriculture, at the same time meant that the 
transfer of labour from agriculture would lead to a decline in agricultural output more or less 
equivalent to the reservation wage of the transferred labourer.  This is of course due to the 
institutional and technological characteristics of Sub-Saharan agriculture, which, to begin with, 
we may assume as given.  A large scale investment effort, as was certainly needed and also 
envisaged in the post-colonial euphoria in Sub-Saharan Africa, would under such conditions 
lead to large increases in demand for food outside agriculture while, at least in the short-run, 
the supply of food would be constrained because of the shift of labour out of agriculture.  
Under these circumstances, whether by government design or under the operation of market 
forces, the rising demand for agricultural output for domestic use would undermine the 
profitability of cash crop exports and would shift the composition of agricultural output 
towards domestically consumed goods.  Wages and prices of domestically consumed 
agricultural products would increase relative to the prices of export cash crops and non-
agricultural products.  This is not of course a sustainable process.  But to the extent that the 
country can rely on external loans to cover the balance of payments gap, the government may 
be able to maintain the investment process by bolstering profit margins in non-agricultural 
activities through cheapening the labour cost by food subsidies.  To the extent that such 
policies lead to further increase in demand for labour outside agriculture, it could further lead 
to a contraction of agriculture (or a slow down in its growth in an economy with population 
growth), particularly of the agricultural export sector.  In this type of labour constrained growth 
process, real wage increases relative to labour productivity growth would be inevitably much 
higher than in the Asian type surplus labour economies.  The build-up of foreign debt would, 
however, bring this type of growth process sooner or later to an end.   
 
 
4.  Development Constraints in Economies with Limited Supply of Labour      
The above scenario of growth process in labour constrained economies, however, is by no 
means inevitable.  The above chain of reasoning started with the key assumption that the 
technology of production in the agricultural sector was given.  However, with the possibility of 
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introducing labour saving technologies which can continuously increase the productivity of 
labour in agriculture as labour increasingly moves to the non-agricultural sectors, there is no 
reason why the Sub-Saharan type economies could not follow similar growth processes as the 
surplus labour Asian economies.  Apart from the nature of their resource availabilities and 
factor proportions, therefore, the possibilities of introducing labour saving technological 
change in agriculture should be considered an important part of the definition of, and growth 
prospects in, labour constrained economies.   
There are those who believe price distortions as the main cause of African agricultural 
underdevelopment.  Such beliefs are critically based on the assume that endogenous 
technological change under the pressure of market forces and given the right price signals 
would have automatically taken care of the necessary technological transformations.  They 
would argue that for example in the above discussed scenario of growth, rising non-agricultural 
product wages and relative prices of domestically consumed agricultural products would 
induce greater investment in agriculture and greater utilization of labour saving technologies in 
the sector.  The fact that this did not take place in Sub-Saharan Africa is argued to be because 
of the price distortions introduced by government food subsidies and protection of non-
agricultural sectors.   This argument, however, ignores some of the important structural 
features of Sub-Saharan African agriculture, which could either weaken the transmission of 
price signals or may limit the ability of the producers to respond to the price signals in the 
desired manner.  Predominant amongst such structural impediments, as emphasized by most 
specialists of African agriculture, are the backward state of infrastructure which introduce 
prohibitive transaction costs for a large segment of small peasant food producers in the region, 
and the lack of ready availability of new technologies of production suitable to the soil and 
climatic conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa and at the same time adaptable to the conditions of 
small food producers in the region.   
The poor state of Sub-Saharan African infrastructure relative to Asia has been extensively 
discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Ahmed and Rustagi, 1984, Riverson, et al., 1991, Ahmed 
and Donovan, 1992, Spencer, 1994, World Bank, 1996, Hayami and Platteau, 1997, and 
Terranishi, 1997).  The low population densities in most Sub-Saharan African countries and the 
dispersion of rural population over vast expanses of land are argued to have led to a low 
density of road networks and other communication links (Hayami and Platteau, 1997).  As can 
be seen from Table 6, population density in Asia is on average about 9 times higher than the 
median for Sub-Saharan African  countries in our sample.  There are of course wide variations 
in population densities across the countries in the two regions, and Nigeria, the most populous 
country in Africa, has population densities close to or above countries such as China, Indonesia 
and Malaysia in Asia.  Table 6 also shows road densities in the two continents, which gives 
some indication of the backward state of transport facilities in Africa relative to Asia.  The 
overall road densities indicate median figures for Asia which are double those of Sub-Saharan 
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Africa.  Most of the roads in Sub-Saharan Africa are, however, unpaved and not suitable for 
motorized transport.  As shown in Table 6, the density of paved roads in Asia in 1970 was on 
average nine times higher than Sub-Saharan Africa.  Though during the 1970s the gap was 
somewhat reduced, during the crisis decade of the 1980s road construction in Sub-Saharan 
Africa showed a noticeable slowdown, and by 1990 the gap in paved road density between the 
two continents once again widened to the same order of magnitude as in the early 1970s (Table 
6).  A more or less similar situation existed in terms of rail and water transport between the two 
continents (see, Ahmed and Donovan, 1992).            
The overall road density figures, however, do not reflect the extent to which the existing roads 
benefit rural areas.  The available evidence shows that in fact the rural transport links in Sub-
Saharan Africa are even weaker than suggested by the road density figures shown in Table 16.  
For example according to the study by Riverson, et al. (1991), in Nigeria, one of the countries 
in Africa which according to the data in Table 16 has much better than average road networks, 
rural road density was in fact one eighth of density in rural regions in India with similar 
population densities (see, also Spencer, 1994).  Once one takes into account the quality of the 
roads and means of transport, the gap between Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia will be further 
widened.  This picture is repeated with perhaps even more intensity with respect to other 
infrastructural facilities such as electricity, telecommunications, health and sanitation etc.  For 
example, Ahmed and Donovan (1992, p.5), comparing seven countries in Africa with five 
countries in Asia note; in Africa ‘only 3-5 per cent of villages in some countries have any 
electrification ... In contrast, in Asian countries roughly 50 percent of villages have electricity’.        
The poor state of infrastructure in rural Sub-Saharan Africa and the dispersion of rural 
population across vast expanses of land of course implies much higher cost of transport and 
trade than in Asia11.  In a study of nine Asian and African countries, for example, Ahmed and 
Rustagi (1984) found much higher marketing margins in Africa as compared to Asia, and even 
a larger gap in regional price differentials in the two regions indicating a low degree of market 
integration in African countries12.  The decomposition of the marketing margins in this study 
showed that close to 40 per cent of the gap between Africa and Asia was due to higher 
transport and storage costs.  Of the remaining 60 per cent, about a half, 33 per cent, was due to 
higher taxation and profits, and the residual 27 per cent is attributed by Ahmed and Rustagi to 
inefficiencies arising from the operations of marketing boards.  The high transaction costs 
                                                 
11  Weak transport infrastructure is not the only reason for high transportation costs.  Other infrastructural weaknesses can also 
play an important role.  For example, as noted by Ahmed and Rustagi, the lack of electrification of rural Sub-Saharan Africa 
meant that bulky unmilled products had to be transported long distances to the milling centers which substantially added to 
transport costs.  
12 According to Ahmed and Rustagi (1984), the average producer price expressed as a percentage of the terminal market price 
raged between 75 to 90 per cent in Asian countries, while the comparable figure for African countries was 35 to 60 percent.  
They also found that while regional price differentials in Asia corresponded to the prevailing trade and transport margins, in 
the case of Africa regional price differentials were even larger than that warranted by the higher trade and transport margins, 
indicating lack of market integration in Africa.   
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resulting in the first place from the lack of development of infrastructure have substantially 
reduced the tradability of agricultural products for the larger part of the small producers in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and as far as international trade is concerned transaction costs for the majority 
of small producers not in the vicinity of major ports have been prohibitive.  According to 
Delgado (1997, p.156), this ‘semi-open’ character of Sub-Saharan African agriculture is 
because ‘transport and other marketing costs for the bulky items in which they trade -- 
including food staples and major exportables -- end up doubling and tripling the price of 
exportables at the African dockside (f.o.b. price) relative to their price at the farm gate; a 
similar price rise occurs for importables between their delivery to an African port (c.i.f. price) 
and the point of consumption’.  This view which is shared by many other analysts of African 
agriculture (e.g., Koester, 1986, Jaeger, 1992, Jayne and Jones, 1997), partly explains the lack 
of response of agricultural prices and output to trade flows and to the movements of real 
exchange rate (see, e.g., Teranishi, 1997).        
The second and related structural problem facing the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African 
agriculture pertained to the technological conditions of production and the possibilities of 
technological change.  The post-colonial countries in Africa faced two distinct possible 
technological trajectories; one exemplified by the South African path, and the other by the 
intensive smallholder farming in Asia.  The South African path, consisted of a technological 
set up based on large scale, extensive commercial farming with a high degree of substitution of 
capital for labour.  South Africa’s agricultural system, with one of the lowest labour/land ratios 
in Africa, and with yields which were no more than average for Africa, has attained one of the 
highest labour productivity rates amongst the African or Asian countries (Table 4).  This 
system, however, was neither politically viable nor economically affordable for the rest of 
post-colonial Sub-Saharan African economies, nor was it advisable under the prevailing 
infrastructural conditions in Africa.  To concentrate scarce capital on extensive commercial 
farms with low employment generating potential would have left the majority of the population 
which were small agricultural producers in a state of perpetual underdevelopment.  Though 
there has been some debate on the appropriateness of large scale extensive farming versus 
intensive peasant farming in the post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa, specially in  relation to 
Eastern and Southern African agriculture, the main thrust of policy has come to be settled by 
and large on the intensive farming, small producer Asian path as the only viable alternative in 
Africa (see, Mellor, Delgado and Blackie, 1987a).     
The emulation of the Asian type intensive farming, however, in addition to investment 
requirements for the development of economic infrastructure such as transport, power, and 
irrigation, as well as new inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides, also required 
substantial new investments in research and extension services.  The agro-climatic conditions 
in Sub-Saharan African agriculture, which were different from Asia and at the same time 
highly varied across different sub-regions in Africa, meant that a simple transplantation of the 
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seed/fertilizer technology of the Asian green revolution without basic new research and 
development was impractical13.  Without the development of appropriate new technological 
packages which could ensure adequate returns as well as stability of income for small farmers, 
other public investments in agricultural infrastructure would have remained by and large 
ineffective. 
As in the case of Asia, therefore, the development of small producer, intensive farming in Sub-
Saharan Africa required a substantial gross inflow of new inputs in the form of both fixed 
investment and producer goods from outside agriculture.  A major difference between the two 
regions, however, was the much higher investment requirements in Sub-Saharan African 
agriculture relative to the availability of resources.  This constituted an important aspect of the 
structural problems of agriculture in Africa.  The central institutions through which the post-
colonial Sub-Saharan African countries attempted to overcome some of these structural 
problems were the marketing boards.  Marketing boards which were inherited from the colonial 
times, were strengthened in the post-colonial period and used, in addition to revenue raising 
devices, as a mechanism for provision of subsidized inputs, and transportation and marketing 
outlets for the small producers which were hitherto cut off from such provisions.  As pointed 
out by Jayne and Jones (1997, p.1521) in the context of East and Southern Africa, this ‘became 
the cornerstone of an often explicit social contract made by the majority governments at 
independence in an attempt to redress the imbalances of the former colonial regimes’.  The 
establishment of marketing board stations in remote regions and the policy of pan-territorial 
pricing, for example constituted a substantial subsidy to small producers, and of course a tax on 
producers with better infrastructure and market access.  The grant of subsidized inputs and 
credits to producers in remote areas constituted a similar tax/subsidy mechanism.  A large part 
of what in recent years has been referred to as taxation of agriculture, thus took the form of a 
redistribution of income within agriculture through these implicit internal tax/subsidy 
mechanisms, rather than the ‘plundering’ of agriculture by the other sectors.  This is 
particularly manifest in the rapid buildup of financial deficits of marketing boards from the 
mid-1970s in most countries, which meant that agriculture was becoming a growing burden on 
the rest of the economy.     
This strategy seems to have been successful in smallholding areas where other complementary 
conditions, particularly improved technology and other supporting services, existed; e.g., the 
smallholder response to new varieties of maize in the so-called maize belt in Southern and 
                                                 
13  Thus according to Delgado and Mellor (1984, p.666) ‘the adaptive model of technology transfer will not be sufficient to 
deal with African problems’.  According to Matlon and Spencer (1984, p.672), ‘Such differences [between Asian and African 
agriculture] help explain the lack of success to date in the direct introduction of exotic high-yielding cultivars, except for 
irrigated rice where the environment can be modified to suit the crop.  For example, ICRISAT has had little success with direct 
introductions of Indian sorghum and millet varieties to West Africa.  And after seven years of variety trials in which over 2000 
varieties were imported for trials in the mangrove swamps of West Africa, the West African Rice Development Association 
found only two varieties that perform as well as the best local varieties’.  On the technological conditions of production under 
different agroclimatic zones in Sub-Saharan Africa see, Thomas and Whittington, 1969, Malton, 1987, Collinson, 1987, and 
Kuile, 1987. 
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Eastern Africa, tea in Kenya and cotton in southern Mali (Mellor, et al., 1987)14.  The problem 
with this strategy in many countries, however, was that in most cases these other 
complementary conditions were not met, and hence the subsidies to smallholders, to the extent 
that they actually did receive them, did not lead to noticeable productivity gains in agriculture.  
This can be seen from the poor performance in terms of growth and variability in yields for 
cereals and coarse grains in most Sub-Saharan African economies, and in particular in relation 
to Asia, as shown in Tables 7 and 8.  As can be seen, the average cereal yields in Sub-Saharan 
Africa as a whole which were about 50 per cent of those in Asia in the early 1960s, fall to 30 
per cent of the latter in the early 1990s (Table 7).  An even more disappointing picture is 
exhibited by the yields of coarse grains, which starting from a more or less equal average value 
as in Asia in the early 1960s, fell to less than half of the latter in the early 1990s (Table 8).   
The main source of the problem was that this strategy very thinly spread the scarce investible 
resources across vast areas of smallholder agriculture which, as noted above, did not have the 
basic pre-requisites for modern intensive farming.  An important implication of the lack 
adequate infrastructure, particularly the meager irrigation facilities, is the high degree of year 
to year variation in agricultural output and yields.  As shown in Table 7, the standard deviation 
of the annual growth rates of average cereal yields was rapidly increasing in Africa, and was 
between 3 to 4 times higher than Asia during the 1961-95 period.  A similar, though more 
moderate, difference in the variability of yields with respect to coarse grains is evident from 
Table 8.  With such high degrees of variability of yields, indicating the high risks involved for 
farmers investing in new technologies in African agriculture, the low response of farmers to 
subsidies is not surprising.  A more appropriate strategy for the development of smallholder, 
intensive farming under the prevailing conditions in most Sub-Saharan African countries 
would have been to concentrate the scarce investible resources within a more limited area, in 
areas with the highest growth potential, and to encourage the populations of the remoter, less 
hospitable regions to migrate for work to such growth poles.  It is only under such 
concentrations of population and infrastructural pre-requisites that the conditions appropriate 
for Asian type intensive farming could be met15.   
The difference between the more successful Asian agriculture and that of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
therefore, was not necessarily that one was taxed more heavily than the other.  As it is well 
known, the Japanese agriculture during early Meiji period, and that of post-war Taiwan, were 
also taxed, and perhaps even more heavily.  However, through adequate provision of public 
infrastructural investment and productivity enhancing technologies, the benefit to the farmers 
                                                 
14  According to Jayne and Jones (1997, p.1522), ‘Where smallholder grain production and uptake of hybrid seed and fertilizer 
have expanded significantly since independence [in South and East Africa], this growth has been associated with major 
investments in state marketing infrastructure and credit disbursement, and state coordination of credit, input delivery, and 
assured outlets for crop sale’. 
15  This strategy is also suggested by Ahmed and Rustagi (1984) and Hayami and Platteau (1997). 
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outweighed the effect of taxes.  In the case of Africa, on the other hand, taxes were paid by a 
faction of agricultural producers -- those closer to and with better means of access to major 
domestic markets, and export cash crop producers -- but the benefits, to the extent that they did 
not dissipate in the inefficient practices of marketing boards, were spread over vast areas and 
spent on subsidies to farmers with much less effectiveness than in Asia.  The root cause of the 
problem was of course the extreme limitations of the resource base relative to the size of the 
required investments.  It is to these two issues, namely the indirect taxation of agriculture and 
the financing of accumulation that we shall next turn in the next two sections. 
 
 
4.  Surplus Labour, Economic Duality, and the Agricultural Squeeze Hypothesis 
 
A central theme in the debate on agricultural development in Sub-Saharan Africa has been the 
heavy drainage of agricultural surplus, mainly taking the form of forced indirect taxation, 
which is argued to have led to the poor performance of the agricultural sector and declining 
overall economic conditions.  For example, according to the World Bank, ‘African farmers 
have faced the world’s heaviest rates of agricultural taxation... explicitly through producer 
price fixing, export taxes, and taxes on agricultural inputs.  They were also taxed implicitly 
through overvalued exchange rates, and through high levels of industrial protection...’ (World 
Bank 1994, p.76).  This view, which we may refer to as the agricultural squeeze hypothesis, is 
a recurrent theme in a large number of the studies on agricultural development in Africa16.  
One indicator which seems to lend support to this view is the apparent extreme duality in sub-
Saharan African economies as compared to Asia, with per capita income and productivity in 
the non-agricultural sectors being well above the agricultural sector even in comparison to 
other developing countries.    
One measure of such duality is the ratio of value added per worker in the agricultural sector 
over value added per worker in the non-agricultural sectors (hereafter referred to as the V-
ratio), shown in table 9 for the countries in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  As shown in the first 
column of the table, the median for this ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa in the mid-1960s was 
below 10 per cent, while in Asia it is over 25 per cent, and excluding China and Thailand, over 
30 per cent17.  In Sub-Saharan Africa only five countries, namely, South Africa, Sudan, 
Nigeria, Ghana and Mali, had relative value added shares close to Asia (over 20 per cent) in 
1965-66.  Some authors have interpreted the low V-ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa as indication 
of ‘urban bias’ and discriminatory taxation of agriculture (see, e.g., Lipton, 1977, 1987).  The 
figures may also appear in conformity with the more popular notions of economic duality in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘plundering of agriculture’ a la Schiff and Valdes (1992).   
                                                 
16  See e.g., World Bank (1994),  Lipton (1991), Cleaver (1985), Bates (1984) and the sources quoted there. 
17   China is a special case, where the government at the time restricted the mobility of labour between sectors and areas, hence 
generating a huge surplus labour in rural areas.  See, Karshenas, 1995, ch.9, pp.147-165. 
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Before interpreting these results, however, a precautionary note on the data is in order.  Firstly, 
as noted by a number of authors, estimates of agricultural value added in Africa may be under-
estimates (see, e.g., Poleman, 1981 and Jaeger, 1992).  However, for this to explain the 
divergence of the median gap in V-ratio between Africa and Asia, there must have been a 50 
per cent underestimation in the agricultural value added estimates for Africa, which is not 
plausible.  As is well know, employment data, particularly those of agricultural employment, 
can be also notoriously error-ridden.  There are, however, no reasons for the agricultural 
employment data in Africa to be so consistently overestimated relative to Asia to give rise to 
the striking differences shown in the table.   
Another cause of concern about the data, which for our purpose could be more important than 
the problems with employment data, is that the value added figures are measured in market 
prices rather than factor cost.  For the V-ratio to reflect relative incomes received by producers 
in the two sectors, the factor cost measure would be the appropriate one.  This would 
particularly create a certain degree of inconsistency between the measurements for the two 
regions due to their different types of agricultural marketing institutions.  In most Sub-Saharan 
African economies a major part of indirect taxes on agriculture are likely to be reflected in the 
sale/purchase margins of marketing boards which would be allocated to the value added in 
trade and transport sector rather than indirect taxes on agriculture.  In the case of Asian 
economies, however, the agricultural value added figures include indirect taxes.  The Sub-
Saharan African figures therefore are likely to be closer to the factor cost concept of value 
added than the market price notion18.  This could lead to some overestimation of value added 
ratios in Asia relative to Africa, but the order of magnitude of such possible overestimation is 
still relatively moderate19.   
Though each of the above data problems by themselves may not be sufficient to explain the 
considerable gap in the median V-ratio between Africa and Asia, their combination can exert a 
considerable influence on the observed figures for individual countries.  The changes in 
marketing institutions and accounting conventions over time also introduce added reasons to be 
extremely cautious in interpreting the trends in the behaviour of V-ratios.  Nevertheless, with 
these caveats in mind, the behaviour of the V-ratios may furnish a useful starting point in 
examining the overtaxation hypothesis in the case of Africa as well as analyzing the contrasting 
positions of agriculture in the Asian and African economies.  The lower V-ratio for the Sub-
                                                 
18  This of course varies across the countries depending on the accounting practices and marketing institutions and the type of 
the product.  According to Ahmed and Rustagi (1984), for example, taxes on food grains which varied from 3 to 10 per cent in 
African countries and from 2 to 5 per cent in the Asian countries are internal local taxes, which should be explicitly reflected in 
the market price figures. 
19   Even assuming as high as a  20 per cent indirect tax on agriculture in Asia, and similar indirect tax rates on non-agriculture 
in the two regions, the correction for this factor would reduce the relative value added ratios in the table by no more than 5-6 
per cent which is relatively small relative to the large differences in these ratios between Africa and Asia.  Since indirect taxes 
on agriculture in Asia are likely to be mainly imposed on exports, and as the agricultural exports in Asian countries in the 
sample are a fraction of total agricultural production, the 20 percent indirect tax assumption itself is likely to be an exaggerated 
figure. 
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Saharan African economies could be either due to their lower terms of trade for agriculture 
relative to Asia, or due to high real productivity differentials between non-agriculture and 
agriculture relative to the prevailing differentials in Asian countries, or a combination of the 
two.  Of course the different elements of the V-ratio are not independent.  An artificially low 
terms of trade for agriculture, for example through an overvaluation of the exchange rate and 
high urban wages, can lead to the adoption of capital intensive techniques in the non-
agricultural sectors which would further reinforce the price effect on the V-ratio.  On the other 
hand, the technological conditions of production can entail different relative price 
configurations in different countries.  It is in fact our contention that the relatively low V-ratios 
in Africa, to the extent that they are not caused by measurement errors, are largely due to the 
technical and institutional conditions of production in African agriculture in contrast to Asia.  
In order to establish this point, however, we should start with some of the more conventional 
views, including the agricultural ‘squeeze hypothesis’, discussed in the literature. 
According to the conventional view on the dual structure of the colonial economy in Africa, it 
would be plausible assume that in the immediate aftermath of the Colonial period the 
productivity and price factors both played a part in lowering the relative V-ratios in Africa.  As 
noted above, the conventional view is that colonial policy was geared to a highly dualistic 
economic structure where a highly productive modern sector existed side by side of a vast 
marginalized indigenous subsistence agriculture.  The lack of mobility of labour, due to 
government restrictions, racial discrimination, or rural poverty, would have prevented the 
narrowing of productivity differentials between the sectors20.  At the same time, the existing 
evidence suggests that at least in East and Southern Africa the colonial governments used the 
agricultural marketing boards to price discriminate against the indigenous agricultural 
producers21.  While both the relative price and productivity differentials played a part in 
lowering the V-ratio, the real productivity differentials should have played a more important 
role during the colonial times.  In the early years of the post-colonial period it would be natural 
for productivity differentials to have persisted for some time.  To raise the productivity of the 
marginal sector would have required massive new investments, and so would the restructuring 
of the modern sector in accordance with the national factor availabilities which may have also 
implied a substantial lowering of real wages in that sector.  Both of these processes would have 
required time, and hence it would be plausible to assume that by 1965, the earliest date for 
which employment data for most of the sample countries are available, the major part of the 
                                                 
20   This is obvious in the case of countries where mineral exports or other non-agricultural primary exports form the engine of 
growth of the non-agricultural modern sector.  However, the duality between agriculture and non-agriculture could still be 
maintained even under the conditions where there are no non-agricultural mineral exports and plantation agriculture forms the 
engine of growth of the modern non-agricultural sector, as long as there exists a large enough low productivity agricultural 
sector side by side of the high productivity plantations.  In this way, the duality within the agricultural sector would also give 
rise to an apparent dual structure between non-agriculture and agriculture as a whole.  This would be reinforced if the traders 
and colonial administrators due to their monopoly power also cream off a large share of the income in the high productivity 
export-oriented part of agriculture. 
21   See, e.g., Jayne and Jones (1997) and sources quoted there. 
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relative differentials between agriculture and non-agriculture would be still explained by real 
productivity differentials in the two sectors.   
However, one would expect that with growing investment in the hitherto neglected indigenous 
agriculture by the post-colonial state, with greater mobility of labour and lowering of non-
agricultural sector wages, and with the restructuring of the non-agricultural sector towards 
more appropriate factor proportions and output structure, the productivity differential between 
the agriculture and non-agriculture would decline over time.  Also with growing 
industrialization, as in the case of other developing countries, the burden of taxation would 
gradually shift to the non-agricultural sector, and hence the price differentials between 
agriculture and non-agriculture would decline to more ‘normal’ levels.  Both these tendencies 
would be expected to narrow the differential in the V-ratio between Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia in the subsequent course of development.   
This is of course the ideal scenario, or what one would have expected to observe in the course 
of development in dual economies of the type the post-colonial Sub-Saharan African countries 
are believed to have represented.  According to the proponents of agricultural squeeze 
hypothesis, however, misguided government policies in the subsequent period derailed the 
African economies off such ideal trajectory.  According to this view, the macroeconomic, 
sectoral, and exchange rate and trade policies pursued by most African countries are believed 
to have led to a drain of resources from agriculture and a widening gap between agriculture and 
other sectors.  The deteriorating terms of trade of agricultural sector, and the resulting 
productivity gap between agriculture and other sectors, according to this view should be 
manifested in a declining V-ratio and a growing gap between agricultural and non-agricultural 
incomes -- at least up to the early 1980s when severe economic disequilibria forced most 
governments in the region to introduce reform programmes.  As it turns out, however, neither 
the hypothetical ideal scenario of the dual economy models, nor the trajectory portrayed by the 
proponents of agricultural squeeze hypothesis fit the observed behaviour of the V-ratios in 
Sub-Saharan African economies in the post-colonial period.  
The trends in the V-ratio for the Sub-Saharan African and Asian countries in the sample for the 
1965-95 period are shown in Table 9.  As can be seen, the median V-ratio for Africa is more or 
less stagnant during the 1965-80 period, with some countries showing moderate increases in 
the ratio.  Only three countries, namely, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria, show noticeable 
declines in V-ratio in this period, in conformity with agricultural squeeze hypothesis.  During 
the 1980-95 period, however, V-ratios in many Sub-Saharan African countries registered much 
sharper increases, so that by 1995 they had attained ratios equal to Asian norms, though by 
1995 the median ratio for Africa (16.6%) was still well below Asia (27 %).  There are various 
factors which can account for the differences across the individual countries as well as the 
changing behaviour over time of the per capita value added ratio, which could be only 
adequately explained by detailed country case studies.  In this paper, however, we are mainly 
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concerned with possible general tendencies which could be shown to have had an overriding 
effect on the differential performance between the African and Asian economies, and between 
the actual trends in Africa and the trends suggested by the agricultural squeeze hypothesis as 
well as the ideal scenario discussed above.  For this purpose we need to decompose the V-ratio 
into its various constituent elements. 
A useful decomposition for our purpose would be to examine the changes in V-ratio in terms 
of the changes in agricultural terms of trade (the relative price effect) plus the changes in real 
labour productivity gap between agriculture and non-agriculture.  The change in the V-ratio is 
equal to the change in agricultural labour productivity, minus labour productivity growth in the 
non-agricultural sector, plus the improvement in agricultural terms of trade.  The estimates of 
these variables for 1965-80 and 1980-95 are shown in Table 10.  Despite the diversity of 
experiences across countries, a number of important contrasting tendencies in Africa and Asia 
stand out.  Firstly, during the 1965-80 period, which is believed to the period in which African 
agriculture was being increasingly taxed through the terms of trade effect, the V-ratios in most 
Sub-Saharan African economies showed positive trends.  In fact, a declining V-ratio in this 
period was more a common trait of Asian countries than the Sub-Saharan African ones.  
Furthermore, in a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where the V-ratios showed significant 
declines during the 1965-80 period (namely, Burkina Faso, Congo, Lesotho, Mali, Niger and 
Nigeria), only in one country, namely Niger, there was a significant deterioration in 
agricultural terms of trade as hypothesized by the agricultural squeeze hypothesis.  This of 
course does not tell us much about the level of taxation of agriculture through the terms of 
trade effect in Africa, but it indicates that the data considered here do not suggest any 
systematic increase in the rate of agricultural taxation during the path of development over the 
1965-80 period.  This also does not mean that rates of taxation on certain cash crops in some 
countries did not increase over the 1965-80 period, but that the overall agricultural terms of 
trade effect did not follow this trend.  All this, is of course based on the terms of trade effect 
measurements done on the basis of implicit GDP deflators for agriculture and non-agriculture 
with all the related data problems we discussed earlier, to which we shall return again shortly.  
 Another result shown in Table 10, with regard to the 1980-95 period, is that a significant part 
of the increase in the V-ratio for most Sub-Saharan African economies during this latter period 
seems to be explained by the collapse of labour productivity in the non-agricultural sector.  The 
median for the non-agricultural productivity growth for the sample countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa was -2.0, in contrast to a 2.5 per cent growth for Asia.  Of the 28 Sub-Saharan countries 
in the sample only 5 achieved positive non-agricultural productivity growth rates during the 
1980-95 period, and only four of them showed non-agricultural productivity growth rates 
which were higher than productivity growth in agriculture.  This meant that despite the 
negative terms of trade effect for agriculture in at least half of the sample countries in Africa, 
most countries achieved increasing V-ratios during the 1980-95 period (Table 10).  Thus the 
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observed trends in the past three decades in the Sub-Saharan African economies also seem to 
exhibit a totally different picture from the ideal scenario pictured above.  By the mid-1970s in 
most countries in the sample the V-ratio had not shown discernible changes, indicating the 
continuity of the apparent economic duality inherited from the colonial times.  Even during the 
1980s when a number of countries showed signs of convergence between agricultural and non-
agricultural productivities, this was in major part explained by the collapse of the non-
agricultural productivity than by fast rates of growth of productivity in agriculture.  The 
improvement in agricultural terms of trade in some African countries during that decade, 
therefore, did not mean a shift of taxation to the buoyant non-agricultural sector, as envisaged 
in the ideal scenario discussed above, but rather it meant rapidly declining real wages in the 
non-agricultural sector in that decade.  
 To what extent are the above observations affected by the data problems discussed at the 
beginning of this section?  Measurement errors would certainly make comparison of V-ratios 
across the countries problematic.  But as noted above, even allowing for such measurement 
errors, there is strong evidence to suggest that V-ratios in the 1960s for Sub-Saharan Africa 
were in general well below the Asia average.  If we assume that estimation methods have 
remained consistent over time then the trends in real productivity growth rates in agriculture 
and non-agriculture would probably be less affected by such measurement errors.  The same 
cannot be said about the trends in implicit deflators and hence the terms of trade measures in 
Table 10.  As noted above, changes in marketing institutions and accounting procedures can 
affect these substantially.  For example, an African country which dismantles its marketing 
boards in the early 1980s and instead introduces an indirect tax of 30 t0 40 per cent on 
agricultural sales would register a proportionate increase in agricultural implicit deflators 
measured in market prices, without this necessarily affecting the price received by the 
producers.  For this reason the terms of trade improvements for some African economies 
during the 1980s shown in the table may be overestimates.  For the same reason the increase in 
the V-ratio for the same countries during the 1980s would be an overestimate.  These 
considerations, however, do not seriously affect the main conclusions which matter for our 
discussion, namely that the V-ratio in Sub-Saharan African countries on average was 
appreciably below Asia in the 1960s, and that in the subsequent period the ratio did not decline 
appreciably.   
How can one then explain the lower V-ratios in Sub-Saharan African economies relative to 
Asia?  This question was first raised by Lipton (1977) in the context of developing countries in 
general, while he also pointed out the extremely low ratios for African countries relative to 
other developing countries. In a later paper Lipton has reiterated the point in the specific 
context of Africa (Lipton, 1987).  In the absence of any other explanations Michael Lipton puts 
this down to the effect of over-taxation of agriculture and the ‘urban bias’ of government 
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policies in these economies22.  It is however difficult to believe that during the 1960s, some of 
the sparsely populated countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with rich mineral exports (e.g., Zaire 
or Zambia), taxed their agriculture more than some of the densely populated, resource poor, 
countries in Asia (e.g., Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka).  Instead, here we argue that the relatively 
low V-ratios in Africa can be explained in terms of the structural characteristics of the agrarian 
economies in Sub-Saharan Africa in contrast to Asia discussed above.   
As discussed in Section 3, due to these structural differences between the agricultural systems 
in the two regions, we would expect wages in the non-agricultural sector in the post-colonial 
Sub-Saharan Africa to be on average much higher than Asia relative to agricultural prices.  
Assuming a closed economy setting to start with, and further assuming the same non-
agricultural technologies and industrial markups in the two regions, non-agricultural prices 
relative to agricultural prices in Africa would be also proportionately higher.  Technologies in 
the non-agricultural sectors of the two regions, however, would not be the same.  In Africa 
higher wages would induce the use of labour saving technologies with a much higher capital 
intensity as compared to Asia.  This would increase labour productivity in non-agriculture 
relative to agriculture in Africa and hence push down V-ratios further.  Depending on the 
degree of protection of the non-agricultural economy and the prevailing market structures, this 
effect may be somewhat alleviated if higher labour productivity in the non-agricultural sector 
somewhat reduces the relative price differentials between agriculture and non-agriculture in 
favour of agricultural products. 
We my relax some of the assumptions of this simple account of matters in a closed economy 
context.  There are further technical aspects of agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which would help explain lower observed V-ratios relative to Asia.  These arise from climatic 
conditions which introduce a high degree of seasonality of agricultural labour in Sub-Saharan 
Africa compared to Asia (see, Delgado and Ranade, 1987).  This would not have affected the 
V-ratios if productivity measurements were done in terms of hours of work.  However, since 
the observed V-ratios are measured in terms of relative value added per labourer, the shorter 
agricultural season would ceteris paribus reduce the observed ratios in Africa relative to Asia.  
V-ratios measured in value added per man year would increase with the growth of irrigation, 
multiple cropping, and the development of intensive farming which would spread agricultural 
labour more uniformly over the year, that is, as the regularity of agricultural work approaches 
that of non-agriculture.   
We can then proceed to relax the assumption of closed economy, but the picture would not 
change dramatically.  In economies where the non-agricultural sector is protected, as was the 
                                                 
22  After a search for different possible explanations, Lipton (1977, p.163) concluded, ‘Neither historical compulsions, then, 
nor the specific features of groups of LDCs, can account for today’s huge and on balance growing disparities [in V-ratios]’.  
He then goes on to assert that ‘Urban biases in private and public power, and hence in pricing and resource allocation, are 
needed to explain high disparities..’. 
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case in most countries under study here, the availability of more capital intensive imported 
technology would help compensate for high non-agricultural wages in Sub-Saharan type 
economies by increasing labour productivity, and would hence push the V-ratio even further 
down.  Even under free trade, as long as the prevailing agrarian institutions remain intact, the 
differentials in V-ratios between Asian and African type economies would remain high, 
because most of the non-agricultural output in fact consists of non-tradable services.  However, 
in Sub-Saharan African type economies which over the years have built up a sizeable non-
agricultural sector under protection, a sudden liberalization of trade would have a dramatic 
effect, as these countries will soon find out that none of their non-agricultural industries, even 
if they are technically efficient by international standards, could survive international 
competition from lower wage Asian type economies.  The opening up of such economies to 
international competition would have a strong deflationary effect on the non-agricultural 
economy in the short and medium run.  The resulting recession in the non-agricultural 
economy would lead to an increase in the V-ratio by both depressing non-agricultural real 
wages and reducing non-agricultural output and productivity.  With the resumption of growth, 
however, the V-ratios would once again tend to their ‘normal’ levels.   Such ‘normal’ levels 
would of course be changing in the long run with population growth, agrarian change and 
particularly with the introduction of labour saving investments in agriculture.   
The results of the following econometric exercise may further help to substantiate empirically 
the above hypothesis regarding the source of variation of V-ratios across countries in Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  V-ratios according to this hypothesis are systematically related to two 
factors; first, the effect emanating from the prevailing agrarian relations which may be referred 
to as the surplus labour effect, or the wage effect, and second, the resulting labour intensity of 
non-agricultural production or the productivity effect.  We have taken land/labour ratio as a 
proxy variable for the first effect.  It should be emphasized that the surplus labour phenomenon 
is not simply a reflection of land labour ratio, but it is essentially a reflection of the prevailing 
agrarian relations.  The case of South Africa is a good example of this point.  Despite low 
levels of labour/land ratios, South Africa, through forced eviction of its indigenous agricultural 
population and colonization of new lands managed to establish a highly mechanized and 
commecialized farming sector with a predominant use of wage labour and extremely high 
levels of labour productivity (Table 4).  This also generated a surplus labour, mainly residing in 
labour camps and labour reserve towns, which solved the labour shortage problem of the non-
agricultural sector.  The transformation of production conditions in agriculture in South Africa 
was not simply a matter of availability of capital to be substituted for labour either.  It was first 
and foremost a forced transformation of agrarian relations and generation of a surplus labour.  
However, since few other countries resorted to such extreme measures as South Africa, and in 
the absence of better proxy variables, we have used the labour/land ratio as a proxy for the 
reservation wage in non-agriculture relative to average productivity of labour in agriculture.  
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For the second explanatory variable, namely labour intensity in non-agricultural production we 
have taken the share of non-agricultural labour force normalized by the level of per capita 
income, as a proxy.  The justification is that, as shown by Kuznets, Chenery and others, the 
shares of agricultural output and employment appear to systematically vary across countries 
and over time according to level of economic development as measured by per capita income.  
High labour intensity in the non-agricultural sector resulting from low wages in Asian type 
economies would be therefore expected to be reflected in higher non-agricultural employment 
normalized by per capita income.  This variable was constructed by dividing the share of non-
agricultural labour by per capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity exchange rates.  
The V-ratio is therefore expected to a have positive relationship with the two independent 
proxy variables as defined.  The following equation was estimated using a cross-section 
regression on 1965-70 average variables for 36 countries in our sample for which the relevant 
data were available: 
 V-ratio =  -6.17  + 0.74 L/A  + 0.77 Z Ajdusted R2 = 0.67 
 (t-ratio) (-2.05)    (4.11)    (5.61) No. of Observations = 36  
            
where L/A is land-labour ratio and Z is the labour intensity variable23.  As can be seen, both 
estimated coefficients having the expected signs are highly significant, and the two variables 
jointly explain close to 70 per cent of variations in the V-ratio across the sample countries.  
Considering that we have not included any variables directly related to relative prices or terms 
of trade effect between agriculture and non-agriculture, the goodness of fit of the regression is 
indeed remarkable and lends further support to the hypothesis put forward here.   
It appears that once the surplus labour effect or the effect of the differential agrarian structures 
across the countries is taken into account, the relatively low V-ratios in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
are no longer puzzling.  What indeed requires explanation in this new context is why the V-
ratios in countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa amongst the African countries 
were so high.  The case of South Africa should be clear by now.  As noted above it has a totally 
different agrarian structure as compared to other countries in Africa, or Asia for that matter.  
Other outliers such as Ghana and Nigeria need specific country analysis.  It would be, however, 
absurd to conclude on the basis of the high V-ratios in Ghana and Nigeria that in these 
countries the non-agricultural sectors are ‘plundered’ by agriculture, in the same way as it is 
absurd to maintain that low V-ratios are indicative of the agricultural sector being ‘plundered’.    
 
7.  Financing Accumulation and Surplus Labour 
                                                 
23  Labour/land ratio is based on data in Table ??, and share of non-agricultural labour is based on data in Table ??.  Per capita 
GDP at international prices in 1965 is based on Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6.  The land/labour ratio variable was multiplied 
by 10, and the capital intensity ratio by 100, in order to avoid unnecessary decimal points in coefficient estimates. 
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A large share of the required investment for the development of smallholder intensive 
agriculture in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa took the form of public goods which had to be 
produced by the government --  e.g., roads and communications, electricity, large scale 
irrigation and land improvement, research and extension services etc.  It may not be therefore 
inappropriate to begin with the financial constraints facing the governments in the region.  The 
problem of financing public investments of this type has been extensively discussed in the 
economic development literature in relation to surplus labour economies.  Given the possibility 
of using labour intensive techniques with minimum requirements of foreign exchange or other 
scarce resources for this type of investment, it has been argued that in surplus labour 
economies at early stages of their development financial constraints should not pose any 
serious problems for such investments.  To quote Arthur Lewis (1954, p.160): 
Roads, viaducts, irrigation channels and buildings can be created by human labour 
with hardly any capital to speak of --witness the Pyramids, or the marvellous railway 
tunnels built in the mid-nineteenth century almost with bare hands.  Even in modern 
industrial countries constructional activity, which lends itself to hand labour, is as 
much as 50 or 60 per cent of gross fixed investment, so it is not difficult to think of 
labour creating capital without using any but the simplest tools. 
The problem of financing investments of this type in a labour surplus economy thus becomes 
one of what the classical economists referred to as the procurement of a wage fund.  As long as 
agricultural productivity grows at a rate sufficient to provide food for the newly employed 
labour in the investment sector without inflationary food price effects, there would be no 
financial constraints as such to the amount of investment that can be undertaken.  Once the 
existence of surplus labour ensures the availability of labour at given real wages, the 
investment by government or other non-agricultural sectors would be to a large extent self 
financing, in the sense that the surpluses generated in the economy as a result of the new 
investments, and the taxes generated thereby, would finance the original investment (see, e.g., 
Lewis, 1954, Kalecki 1970, Kahn, 1972).  Under these circumstances, even if the original 
investment is financed by money creation, by the time of the completion of the investment 
projects an equivalent amount of savings is generated in the economy, with no, or very 
moderate price inflation24.     
This classical model which is highly relevant to the experience of Asian economies, however, 
breaks down in the case of labour constrained Sub-Saharan African type economies.  In the 
case of labour constrained economies, major investment attempts by the government without 
prior procreation of the required savings through taxation would dissipate in inflationary 
spirals, as the movement of labour from the food producing sector to the new investment sector 
                                                 
24  There would be no inflation if workers and agricultural producers only consumed food.  Since this is not the case, short term 
inflationary pressures would result depending on the extent of excess capacity in the non-agricultural consumer goods 
producing sectors and the rapidity of investment response in these sectors.  In the long run, however, by the time sufficient 
capacities are generated in the consumer goods sectors, price levels and real wages would return to their initial levels.  All this 
of course critically depends on the surplus labour assumption.  
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would reduce the supply of food while increasing the demand for food outside agriculture. The 
resulting rise in food prices and in the incomes of the smallholder food producing sector, under 
the prevailing conditions in Sub-Saharan African agriculture, would be also unlikely to 
generate the necessary finance through voluntary savings of small farmers.  The extreme 
backwardness of rural financial markets in Africa25, and the lack of opportunities for profitable 
investment in their own production activities, because of the lack of appropriate production 
technologies and the necessary infrastructure, would mean that higher incomes are likely to be 
by and large translated into higher consumption by farmers (see, e.g., Delgado and Ranade, 
1987).  This is an additional reason for the significance of taxation for capital accumulation in 
Sub-Saharan African labour constrained type economies.   
In Sub-Saharan African countries which were not large mineral exporters, the major source of 
government tax revenue in the immediate post-colonial period inevitably had to be the 
agricultural sector.  The majority of agricultural producers, namely the smallholder food 
producing sector, however, were not taxed and as noted above appear to have been the 
recipients of relatively large subsidies.  This was only partly due to the post-colonial ‘social 
contract’ which underpinned the politics of the newly independent states as discussed above.  
Direct taxes are very difficult to administer with respect to millions of small subsistence 
producers, specially under the conditions prevailing in African agriculture.  Even indirect 
taxes, e.g., through the purchase prices of marketing boards, would be difficult to implement 
under these circumstances; as, when official prices are below market prices it would be 
extremely costly to ensure delivery to the marketing boards by millions of dispersed small 
producers.  The main burden of taxation therefore in economies which did not have major 
mineral exports had to fall on the export cash crop producers, because they were more 
amenable to government boarder controls26.   
Taxation of the smallholder food producing sector in Sub-Saharan African type economies, 
could have played a dual role in financing investment.  Apart from procuring the necessary 
revenue for government investment, it could also help keep wages in the non-agricultural 
sectors low, by lowering the post tax average product of labour in agriculture, or the 
reservation wage for workers in non-agriculture27.  In the absence of such taxes, therefore, the 
export cash crop producing sector would be doubly squeezed; once to raise revenues to finance 
government investment, and once as a result of the rise in real wages resulting from the transfer 
of labour from the food sector to the investment sector.  This latter type effect, which amounts 
                                                 
25  For an overview of financial institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa see, Nissanke, 1997. 
26  This sharp distinction between export cash crop and food producers is only possible where all the land suitable for export 
cash crops is fully cultivated for this purpose.  This in not however the case for many African countries and there are varying 
degrees of substitution between food and export cash crop production.  To the extent that there are food producers with easy 
access to markets and with land suitable for export cash crops, they should be also included in the category of agricultural 
producers which were taxed.   
27  According to Lewis (1954, p.174) an important effect of land taxes in Meiji Japan was to keep industrial wages down. 
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to a revaluation of the real exchange rate facing cash crop producers (a rise in the price of non-
traded goods relative to export cash crops), also takes place when government investment is 
financed by revenues from mineral exports or by foreign aid.  However to the extent that these 
other types of financing also provide the foreign exchange for the import of cheaper foodstuff 
and other wage goods, they can shift part of the burden off the export cash crop sector to the 
food producing sector. 
At this stage it may be appropriate to make a short digression in order to put into proper 
context two common misconceptions about the post-colonial development of Sub-Saharan 
African economy.  One is that the adverse movement of the terms of trade between cash crop 
exports and non-tradables (i.e., the apparent overvaluation of the exchange rate) is often 
attributed mainly to the import substitution industrialization policies followed by the African 
governments.  It should be clear by now that any major investment effort in social and 
economic infrastructure, necessary to support the growth of intensive smallholder farming in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, would have led to similar ‘overvaluation’ of the exchange rate given the 
labour constrained economies of the region and the inability of the government to tax the 
smallholder food producing farmers.  The building of roads, waterways, ports, schools, 
hospitals, and the training of teachers, technicians, nurses, doctors, scientists, agronomists etc. 
as well as the creation of trade networks, urban centres and other related services, are all pre-
requisites of modern agricultural development.  All these activities are much more labour 
intensive than modern import substitution manufacturing.  Given the very small share of non-
agricultural labour employed in modern manufacturing in most Sub-Saharan African 
economies, even if the whole sector was eliminated it would not help much in removing the 
labour constraint in these economies.  Of course to the extent that the manufacturing sector has 
been a net user of foreign exchange, a less protective industrial policy would have released 
foreign exchange which could have helped to increase other investment activities as far as 
allowed by the possibilities for capital labour substitution or foreign exchange labour 
substitution for such investments.  This leads us to the discussion of the second misconception, 
regarding the capital intensity (or the foreign exchange intensity) of investment projects in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.   
Public sector investments in Sub-Saharan Africa have been usually much more foreign 
exchange intensive than similar projects in Asia.  For example, according to Ahmed and 
Rustagi (1984), the import content of transport costs in Kenya and Tanzania is about 50 per 
cent compared with an average import intensity of only 17 per cent in Indonesia and 
Bangladesh.  Some authors have attributed this mainly to the policy bias by the governments or 
the interests of aid donors, and have suggested that a more labour intensive technical choice 
with more reliance on domestic resources, along the Asian lines, would have reduced the 
financial burden of public investments.  This is not however an entirely satisfactory argument.  
Under the conditions of labour constraint in Sub-Saharan Africa, any attempt to emulate the 
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labour intensity of Asian investment projects would have led either to a drastic reduction of 
total investment or a substantial transfer of labour out of agriculture with a rapid increase in 
wages relative to the price of exportables and a large and unsustainable food import bill.   
The above is not to deny that policy mistakes in terms of both the choice of technique and the 
choice of investment sector have played a part in the development problems of Sub-Saharan 
African agriculture.  However, to focus solely on the failed industrialization attempt and the 
corruption of government officials or self-interest of aid agencies would divert attention from 
the more fundamental problems of development in the region.  Such a one-sided focus can give 
rise to simplistic policy conclusions that once industrial protection is removed, free trade is 
reinstated, the role of government is reduced and foreign aid is curtailed, all will be well.  With 
the severe shortages of public infrastructural capital and serious financing problems resulting 
from the labour constrained nature of most economies in the region, such policy conclusions 
will be highly unrealistic.  Having made these points, we shall end this short digression and 
resume our discussion of the problems of financing accumulation in the region.       
The available evidence does not allow exact estimates of the burden of taxation in Sub-Saharan 
African economies, which in any case would require a detailed country-by-country study.  
Under the prevailing conditions in most post-colonial Sub-Saharan African economies, 
however, it is clear that the main burden of taxation had to fall on the foreign trade sector, 
either export cash crops or mineral exports and in some cases on food producers with better 
access to markets and with high substitution possibilities for cash crop production.  The rest of 
the economy was either too small (e.g., manufacturing sector profits) or too costly to tax (e.g., 
small food producing sector in the outlying regions or informal services).  To the extent that 
high non-agricultural wages were a reflection of the high supply price of labour under the 
prevailing agrarian conditions, without taxing the small food producers the taxation of non-
agricultural wages also could not be very effective in raising government savings.  The extent 
to which agriculture as a whole was taxed depended on specific country conditions, e.g., 
whether there existed a relatively large mineral exporting sector and the nature of the ‘social 
contract’ underpinning the politics of the newly independent states.  As noted above, through 
the pan-territorial pricing system and direct input subsidies, at least a part of the agricultural 
producers appear to have received considerable subsidies during the period of operations of 
marketing boards.  In particular, the growing net deficits of the marketing boards indicates that 
in most countries the outlying food producing sectors were increasingly becoming a net burden 
on the rest of the economy.   
Similar considerations also underpin the low saving capacity of the private sector in Sub-
Saharan Africa relative to Asia.  As the experience of various Asian countries has shown, when 
the appropriate technological conditions for profitable investment in agriculture exist, small 
peasant proprietors do show a high propensity to save and invest in agriculture and related rural 
activities.  For most smallholder producers in Sub-Saharan African agriculture, however, as 
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noted above, the appropriate conditions did not exist, and in the case of cash crop producers 
and more prosperous food producers with better access to markets and with adequate 
infrastructure, a good part of their surpluses were likely to have been taxed through the pan-
territorial pricing system and export taxes.  What however is likely to have contributed most to 
the different savings performances of the private sector in the two regions over time, is the 
rapid growth of an industrial capitalist sector in Asia, and the resulting increase in the share of 
profits in national income, and the weakness of this development in post-colonial Africa.  As 
pointed out by Arthur Lewis (1954, p.157), ‘the major source of savings are profits, and if we 
find that savings are increasing as a proportion of national income, we may take it for granted 
that this is because the share of profits in the national income is increasing’.  This seems to 
have been indeed the case in relation to the Asian countries where accroding to recent studies 
the so called ‘investment-profitability-savings nexus’ has been at the center of rapid increase in 
saving ratios (see, e.g., Akyuz and Gore, 1996 and Singh, 1996).  The existence of surplus 
labour is again critical for the Asian economies to have outperformed African economies in 
this respect.  Surplus agricultural labour allowed the rapid expansion of the capitalist sector 
which increased the share of profits in national income in Asia.  In addition, as discussed in the 
previous section, the slow increase in real wages, relative to labour productivity growth in the 
modern sector in Asia, implied a growing share of profits within the sector itself.  In contrast, 
rising real wages in Sub-Saharan African labour constrained economies has meant both a 
slower growth of the capitalist sector and a lower rate of appropriation of the fruits of 
productivity growth by profits.  To some extent most Sub-Saharan African economies seem to 
have tried to get round this handicap by relying on more capital intensive imported technology.  
This strategy which would initially appear to be effective in relieving labour shortages and 
attaining a higher share of surplus in the modern sector, is however unlikely to be sustainable 
in the long run.  Given that Sub-Saharan African countries could not compete with more 
industrialized countries using similar capital intensive techniques, combined with the mounting 
import requirements of this strategy, it would sooner or later lead to a balance of payments 
crisis.    
It should not be therefore surprising to observe that one of the most striking comparative 
features of the development process in Asia and post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa has been the 
difference between their savings performances.  This can be seen from Table 19, which shows 
national savings and national resource gaps as a percentage of GDP for the sample countries in 
the two regions over the 1965-94 period.  National resource gap is defined as national savings 
minus gross domestic investment.  Despite the possibly very serious measurement errors in 
savings ratios, the figures shown in the table can give an overall picture of broad regional 
averages and trends in savings ratios which may not be far off the mark.  As can be seen, 
during the 1965-74 period, the first post-colonial decade for which data is available, the 
average savings ratio for Sub-Saharan Africa was less than Asia average, but the gap between 
the two regions in this period was closing rapidly.  From the mid-1970s, however, while the 
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average Asian savings ratios continue their upward trend, the average saving ratios in Africa 
follow a declining trend.  While during the 1970-74 period the average savings ratio in Africa 
was only about 5 percentage points below Asia, which was not statistically significant, by 
1990-94 the gap between the two had widened by a staggering 17.5 percentage points (Table 
11).   
A detailed quantitative study of savings ratios in the two regions falls beyond the confines of 
the present study.  However, a number of observations on the behaviour of average savings 
ratios in the two regions in the light of our previous analysis can be made.  The first point is 
that during the 1965-75 period the savings effort in Africa, as indicated by savings ratio 
relative to the level of per capita GDP, was relatively better than in Asia and was improving 
over time.  For example, comparing the data on savings ratio in Table 11 with per capita GDP 
figures in Table 12, it can be seen that during the 1970-74 period, average savings ratio in 
Africa was 14.2 %, which was equal to the average for Asia during 1965-69, while average per 
capita GDP level in Africa in 1970-74 was only 80 per cent of the 1965-69 per capita GDP 
level in Asia.  The reason for the relatively high savings ratios during the early years of the 
post-colonial period in Africa was the high share of exports in GDP in these countries and the 
vigorous investment efforts by the governments in the region using the proceeds from the 
taxation of the export sector.  As shown in Table 20, during 1965-69 period average export 
ratio for Africa was 24.1 per cent which was about 9 percentage point above Asia average.  
The proceeds from the export sector combined with foreign aid allowed relatively high 
investment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa during the first post-colonial decade.  As can be seen 
from Table 11, average investment ratio (combined savings ratio and national resource gap) 
during 1965-74 in Sub-Saharan Africa was only 2-3 percentage points below Asia average.  
The fact that both these sources of financing (i.e., export revenues and foreign aid) were in 
foreign exchange allowed the investment process to continue in the face of the labour 
constraints in Africa, by increasingly relying on more capital intensive imported technologies.             
In the subsequent period, however, other structural elements discussed above came to their 
own and led to a rapid divergence in the trends in savings ratios in the two regions.  From the 
mid-1970s, growing instability in commodity export prices and a persistent deterioration in 
primary commodity terms of trade undermined the main sources of foreign exchange, savings, 
and government revenue in most Sub-Saharan African economies.  As can be seen from Table 
13, most Sub-Saharan African countries during the 1975-93 period have been subject to sever 
negative terms of trade shocks.  Though on average the impact of the adverse terms of trade 
movements on Asia and Africa does not seem to be significantly different, the much more 
diversified export base of the Asian countries has meant that they could cope with the resulting 
income losses much more easily.  As shown in Table 13, the average share of manufacturing 
exports for Asia in 1970-75 was about 36 per cent, and by the early 1990s these countries were 
able to increase this share to over 70 per cent.  The flexibility with which the Asian surplus 
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labour economies could respond to adverse terms of trade shocks by increasing the volume of 
their manufactured exports, could not be emulated by the African high wage, labour 
constrained economies under any conceivable policy regime28.  In this respect it is important to 
note that a few countries in Africa, such as Ghana, who have managed, by dint of exchange 
rate devaluations and wage compression, to increase their share of manufactured exports since 
the mid-1980s, have suffered phenomenal terms of trade losses (Table 13)29.  From the mid-
1970s, therefore, with the declining export revenues, partly due to the terms of trade effect, 
partly due to supply constraints at home, and partly due to demand constraints facing primary 
exporters, the growth process in most Sub-Saharan African economies came to a standstill.  
Initially, during the second half of the 1970s, some African countries managed to increase their 
pace of investment by a substantial increase in foreign borrowing.  The average external 
resource gap for Africa, which was not significantly different from Asia in the earlier periods, 
jumped to more than half of the national savings ratio in 1975-79 (Table 11).  From the early 
1980s, however, a declining savings ratio has meant that the pace of investment could be only 
maintained with a rapid build up of foreign debt. The national resource gap in Sub-Saharan 
Africa on average has increased by more than four folds between the early 1970s and the early 
1990s, while the savings ratio has declined by nearly 50 per cent, with the investment ratio 
remaining on average more or less stable at around 18-19 per cent, about 10 percentage points 
below Asia average (Table 11).   Whether, and to what extent, this phenomenon has been 
reinforced by the adjustment policies pursued by most countries in Africa since the 1980s, is a 
question which we cannot pursue in this paper, but needs serious attention.  
In recent years it has become increasingly popular amongst economists to regard low savings 
ratios in developing countries as a consequence of high rates of foreign aid.  In view of the 
declining per capita incomes (particularly noticeable in the non-agricultural economy), and the 
structural problems which have undermined the savings capability of most Sub-Saharan 
African economies since the late 1970s, this seems to be a misguided view, at least as far as 
Africa is concerned.    Another popular belief, which in the light of the above analysis proves 
to be misguided, is that high wages in Sub-Saharan African economies are the result of high 
rates of inflow of foreign aid.  As noted above, the availability of foreign exchange which 
makes it possible to use capital intensive technologies, if anything, would reduce wage 
pressures at any given rate of investment.  Sub-Saharan African economies could not have 
maintained the same rates of investment, which clearly have not been very high, while using 
more labour intensive technologies, as long as they were not prepared or were not able to tax 
the smallholder agricultural producers.   
                                                 
28  It should be of course noted that not all the Asian economies by the mid-1970s were surplus labour economies.  However, 
countries such as Korea, which by then had passed the surplus labour stage, had already achieved high levels of technological 
sophistication and industrial export shares.  The case of South Africa is of course also different from the labour constrained 
economies in Africa, as we have already pointed out above. 
29  In Ghana for example the real exchange rate in 1990 was twenty time lower the 1983 level. 
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Table 1:  Employment Indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia
Rural  Employment (%)
Population (%) Agriculture Industry Services
1965 1965 1965 1965
Benin 87.7 83.0 4.7 12.4
Botswana 96.1 88.7 3.6 7.7
Burkina Faso 94.8 89.3 3.4 7.4
Cameroon 83.6 86.3 4.4 9.2
Central African Rep. 73.3 88.2 3.0 8.8
Chad 91.0 92.2 2.8 5.0
Congo 67.7 66.0 11.1 22.9
Cote d'Ivoire 76.9 80.6 4.7 14.7
Gambia, The 86.4 87.6 5.2 7.1
Ghana 73.9 61.0 15.3 23.7
Kenya 91.4 86.1 5.1 8.8
Lesotho 93.7 91.6 2.6 5.8
Madagascar 87.6 85.1 4.3 10.5
Malawi 95.1 92.0 3.2 4.8
Mali 87.4 90.4 1.3 8.3
Mauritania 91.0 88.9 3.2 7.9
Mozambique 95.4 87.4 5.5 7.1
Niger 93.2 95.2 1.0 3.8
Nigeria 83.0 72.1 10.2 17.8
Senegal 67.3 83.3 5.5 11.3
Sierra Leone 84.6 78.4 10.9 10.7
South Africa 52.8 31.9 29.5 38.6
Sudan 87.0 81.5 4.8 13.7
Tanzania 94.7 91.5 2.7 5.8
Uganda 93.5 90.9 2.9 6.2
Zaire 73.9 82.0 9.2 8.8
Zambia 76.7 78.7 8.0 13.3
Zimbabwe 85.6 79.2 7.9 13.0
Africa (median) 87.2  86.2 4.7 8.8
Asia (median) 80.7 65.2 12.5 21.2
Bangladesh 93.8 83.7 4.8 11.4
China 81.8 80.8 8.2 11.0
India 81.2 72.9 11.9 15.1
Indonesia 84.2 70.5 9.0 20.5
Korea, Republic of 67.6 55.1 15.1 29.8
Malaysia 70.1 58.6 13.0 28.5
Pakistan 76.5 59.8 18.3 21.9
Philippines 68.4 58.0 15.8 26.2
Sri Lanka 80.1 56.0 13.9 30.1
Thailand 87.1 81.7 5.2 13.1
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1997.
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Table 2:  Labour Land Ratio and Population Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-94
% Land (2) Population Growth Rates(3)
Labour / Land Ratio(1) Under Crops Rural Total
1965 1994 1965 1965-94 1965-94
Benin 591 629 76 1.8 2.7
Botswana 8 10 2 2.5 3.4
Burkina Faso 292 521 27 1.7 2.4
Cameroun 316 396 74 1.3 2.7
Central African Rep 186 243 37 1.7 2.3
Chad 25 51 6 1.6 2.1
Congo 31 47 1 1.1 2.8
C’te d'Ivoire 122 164 17 2.9 3.9
Gambia 601 1169 40 2.9 3.4
Ghana 170 341 28 2.3 2.7
Kenya 143 377 16 2.8 3.6
Lesotho 181 135 14 1.9 2.6
Madagascar 97 177 9 2.4 3.0
Malawi 594 1128 39 3.2 3.5
Mali 51 121 5 2.0 2.6
Mauritania 9 13 1 0.1 2.5
Mozambique 81 143 6 0.9 2.2
Niger 163 251 18 2.7 3.1
Nigeria 214 229 42 1.7 2.8
Senegal 172 341 29 2.3 2.8
Sierra Leone 334 396 16 1.1 2.0
South Africa 24 19 13 2.3 2.5
Sudan 32 54 10 2.4 2.8
Tanzania 153 318 7 2.3 3.1
Uganda 538 896 73 2.9 3.1
Zaire 301 520 32 3.1 3.1
Zambia 29 76 14 2.3 3.3
Zimbabwe 79 164 11 2.4 3.1
Africa (median) 158 236 16 2.3 2.8
Asia (median) 866 1132 89 1.2 2.1
Bangladesh 1637 3932 94 2.0 2.4
China 866 1035 29 1.2 1.6
India 851 1355 92 1.8 2.1
Indonesia 751 1132 68 1.2 2.1
Korea, Rep. 2343 1427 99 -2.6 1.5
Malaysia 427 237 95 1.1 2.5
Pakistan 426 888 79 2.4 3.0
Philippines 934 1095 89 1.2 2.4
Sri Lanka 1024 1513 87 1.6 1.5
Thailand 977 961 97 1.9 2.1
Notes:  1.  Labour land retio is defined as persons per hectare of agricultural land (Arable land plus pastures).
             2.  Percentage agricultural land under annual and permanent crops (including fallow).
             3.  Growth rates refer to annual trend growth rates.  Medians refer to the countries in the Table.
Source:  FAOSTAT
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Table 3:  Irrigation Ratio, Fertilizer and Tractor Use in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-94
Fertilizer Consumption Irrigation Ratio Tractors in Use
1965 1980 1994 1965 1980 1994 1965 1980 1994
Benin 1.1 0.6 14.5 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0
Botswana 5.3 3.5 2.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 30.0 53.8 142.9
Burkina Faso 0.0 1.6 6.6 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.2 0.4 4.6
Cameroun 1.6 5.4 5.0 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 1.0 0.8
Central African Rep 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 1.1
Chad 0.2 0.3 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.5
Congo 13.9 3.8 13.1 0.0 0.7 0.7 33.4 50.0 48.3
C’te d'Ivoire 7.0 27.2 22.4 0.4 2.3 2.5 4.2 15.6 12.8
Gambia 2.9 12.7 4.7 0.8 0.6 1.2 3.4 2.8 2.6
Ghana 0.7 6.3 4.3 0.0 0.4 0.2 12.5 18.4 14.6
Kenya 6.9 16.2 34.5 0.4 1.1 1.7 16.4 17.2 35.0
Lesotho 1.5 15.4 18.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 6.5 47.9 57.8
Madagascar 2.7 3.5 4.4 16.6 25.7 42.1 8.6 10.6 12.8
Malawi 4.3 25.4 16.5 0.1 1.4 1.7 3.0 9.1 8.5
Mali 0.3 6.9 8.3 3.6 2.9 2.7 1.5 4.4 8.2
Mauritania 0.0 6.8 19.5 7.4 25.5 23.9 0.9 14.1 16.1
Mozambique 2.8 9.7 2.4 0.6 2.3 3.6 11.1 20.2 19.5
Niger 0.0 0.8 1.4 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.0 0.3 0.4
Nigeria 0.1 6.2 9.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.4 3.1 3.9
Senegal 5.8 8.3 8.5 3.6 2.6 3.0 1.1 2.0 2.3
Sierra Leone 1.3 4.0 6.2 0.5 4.4 6.0 3.2 7.0 11.3
South Africa 29.8 85.6 51.3 7.3 9.1 8.7 113.5 138.8 85.9
Sudan 2.1 6.5 4.5 13.9 14.6 15.1 2.1 7.8 8.1
Tanzania 3.4 16.1 12.4 1.4 5.5 5.6 81.7 45.5 21.6
Uganda 1.2 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5 6.4 9.3
Zaire 0.2 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 1.3 2.7 3.3
Zambia 2.3 15.4 11.2 0.0 0.4 0.9 3.3 9.1 11.4
Zimbabwe 36.3 70.4 69.7 1.6 3.2 4.5 65.9 67.8 80.0
Africa (median) 1.9 6.4 7.5 0.5 0.9 1.3 3.1 8.4 10.3
Asia (median) 25.0 65.2 141.1 27.1 32.0 38.9 3.9 23.2 77.1
Bangladesh 6.1 46.8 123.9 6.5 17.6 38.9 1.1 4.7 6.3
China 25.4 158.1 321.5 32.8 46.9 53.7 7.1 77.1 77.1
India 5.0 33.6 81.7 16.8 23.4 30.2 3.0 23.2 75.7
Indonesia 5.2 65.2 141.1 21.7 23.9 26.7 3.3 5.1 32.5
Korea, Rep. 155.6 389.8 519.5 55.4 63.4 72.2 0.2 12.9 480.0
Malaysia 112.2 453.0 661.9 27.1 32.0 18.7 27.6 74.3 213.6
Pakistan 3.7 54.0 100.9 60.0 73.4 82.1 3.9 48.7 140.7
Philippines 25.0 64.2 109.0 16.2 23.4 28.6 11.6 20.2 20.8
Sri Lanka 121.6 190.0 234.6 43.0 60.3 60.6 92.0 278.9 346.9
Thailand 3.0 16.7 78.8 15.8 18.3 26.9 4.5 10.9 70.7
Notes:  1.  Figures refer to kg per ha of fertilizer use, percentage of irrigated land, and tractors per 10000 ha (per arable land).
Source:  FAOSTAT
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Table 4:  Output, Land and Labour Productivity in Sub-Saharan African and Asian Agriculture, 1965-94
labour/land
Output Land Ratio Output Land Ratio Output Labour Ratio
1965 1965 1965 1980 1994 1965 1980 1994
Benin 1.3 591 682 834 1795 1155 1674 2855
Botswana 0.7 8 26 26 31 3423 2679 3207
Burkina Faso 2.2 292 266 287 558 908 686 1072
Cameroun 4.5 316 575 787 1002 1822 2647 2531
Central African Rep 1.1 186 235 351 469 1266 1686 1931
Chad 2.4 25 50 52 66 2008 1276 1288
Congo 0.6 31 56 69 91 1790 1717 1919
C’te d'Ivoire 5.3 122 336 663 903 2762 5015 5501
Gambia 0.5 601 1493 876 1093 2485 1097 935
Ghana 6.5 170 552 606 1001 3252 2322 2940
Kenya 6.8 143 268 420 634 1872 1668 1680
Lesotho 0.4 181 170 234 316 940 2310 2351
Madagascar 6.4 97 245 330 395 2528 2429 2224
Malawi 2.3 594 777 1207 1218 1308 1410 1080
Mali 2.9 51 90 125 184 1781 1272 1520
Mauritania 1.1 9 28 30 33 3121 2247 2615
Mozambique 4.3 81 93 106 93 1148 886 653
Niger 3.1 163 240 292 298 1474 1515 1186
Nigeria 35.0 214 506 528 1128 2363 2304 4932
Senegal 4.3 172 533 338 593 3096 1325 1737
Sierra Leone 1.2 334 467 559 671 1398 1734 1695
South Africa 23.6 24 242 376 395 10255 18807 20491
Sudan 10.4 32 96 159 170 3009 3552 3167
Tanzania 9.1 153 241 363 448 1583 1686 1408
Uganda 7.0 538 1046 1120 1589 1945 1420 1773
Zaire 9.0 301 408 559 794 1353 1470 1528
Zambia 1.7 29 49 71 92 1698 1369 1213
Zimbabwe 3.4 79 177 285 366 2252 2416 2228
Africa (median) 3 153 244 344 459 1847 1686 1846
Africa (mean) 6 198 355 416 587 2286 2522 2774
Asia (median) 29 900 1897 2815 4050 2455 3222 3375
Asia (mean) 86 1024 2506 3799 5426 2553 3255 5173
Bangladesh 30.4 1637 3152 3929 5153 1925 1270 1310
China 379.0 866 1066 1355 2600 1231 1445 2511
India 278.6 851 1572 2260 3736 1847 1953 2757
Indonesia 47.6 751 1236 2186 3448 1646 2409 3047
Korea, Rep. 14.3 2343 6282 11300 18156 2681 4403 12721
Malaysia 6.7 427 1522 2694 2955 3561 6310 12488
Pakistan 39.2 426 1615 2539 4363 3794 3553 4913
Philippines 26.2 934 3508 4840 5856 3755 4768 5349
Sri Lanka 6.3 1024 2931 3946 4430 2863 3223 2928
Thailand 28.2 977 2179 2937 3559 2229 3220 3703
t-Test for difference (including South Africa) -4.29 -3.78 -3.33 -0.61 -0.91 -1.64
between the Means (excluding South Africa) -4.28 -3.77 -3.33 -1.73 -2.53 -2.33
Notes: Output is measured in wheat equivalent units in mn tons in 1980 world relative prices. 
Land and labour productivity are in kg per hectare and per head wheat equivalent units.
Medians and means refer to the countries in the table.  Means are simple averages.
Source:  Karshenas (1998) and Table 10.
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Table 5:  Manufacturing Wages in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-94
In U.S. Dollars at Consumption Wages in
 Official Exchange Rates Internatioanal Prices(1) Real Wage Index(2)
1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90
Benin .. 1985 .. .. 407 .. .. .. ..
Botswana .. 2727 2086 .. 457 539 .. 100 69
Burkina Faso .. 2659 .. .. 414 .. .. .. ..
Cameroun 948 3426 6097 168 381 688 76 100 81
Central African Rep .. 1951 3934 .. 288 635 .. 100 147
Chad .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Congo 640 .. 4122 127 .. 854 57 100 116
C’te d'Ivoire 1284 3776 .. 338 634 .. 97 100 ..
Gambia .. 855 1326 .. 208 .. .. 100 101
Ghana 675 1716 1138 92 107 193 186 100 95
Kenya 960 1835 1565 187 330 508 116 100 64
Lesotho .. .. 910 .. .. 295 .. .. ..
Madagascar 645 1477 979 189 260 262 98 100 65
Malawi 351 884 962 84 189 298 88 100 101
Mali 841 1294 .. 203 227 .. 159 100 ..
Mauritania .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Mozambique 533 .. .. 230 .. .. .. .. ..
Niger .. 5151 3445 .. 547 675 .. 100 70
Nigeria 700 2593 2094 82 218 344 110 100 59
Senegal .. 3254 5088 .. 525 875 .. 100 99
Sierra Leone .. .. 618 .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Africa 1622 4175 6957 227 594 1096 75 100 111
Sudan .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Tanzania 567 1081 546 84 128 86 165 100 34
Uganda 548 .. 630 44 .. 99 .. .. ..
Zaire .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Zambia 1341 2928 1692 180 309 216 103 100 39
Zimbabwe 1253 2954 3418 191 404 734 82 100 104
Africa (median) 700 2593 1692 180 330 508 98 100 88
Asia (median) 402 741 1215 100 197 454 82 100 133
Bangladesh 322 426 640 111 155 335 133 100 116
China .. 433 380 .. 133 149 .. 100 128
India 393 741 1215 82 177 454 89 100 133
Indonesia 139 588 827 40 112 302 62 100 165
Korea, Rep. 364 1955 7888 84 295 1065 43 100 227
Malaysia 688 1550 3180 145 274 720 94 100 150
Pakistan 411 810 1538 101 227 607 70 100 177
Philippines 647 927 1814 156 214 476 131 100 125
Sri Lanka 442 486 618 99 197 290 74 100 102
Thailand 495 1093 2268 144 280 694 84 100 125
Afeica (mean) 861 2459 2506 162 349 494 109 100 85
Asia (mean) 433 901 2037 107 206 509 87 100 145
t-Test for difference
between the Means 3.95 4.48 0.53 2.43 3.21 -0.13 1.60 --- -4.15
Notes: 1.  Consumption wages are indices whith Asia median=100, evaluated at PPP consumption exchange rate.
             2.  Wages deflated by consumer price index.  Indeces refer to period averages.
Source:  UNIDO, INDSTAT 1996, World Penn Tables Mark 5.6, and World Economic Indicators, World Bank.
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Table 6:  Population and Road Density in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-94
Population Density Road Density Paved Road Density
1965 1990 1965 1990 1970 1980 1990
Benin 22 41 59 76 .. 8.1 9.4
Botswana 1 2 14 16 0.0 2.0 4.1
Burkina Faso 18 33 61 41 2.4 2.6 4.9
Cameroun 12 24 65 151 2.0 5.4 7.7
Central African Rep 3 5 34 39 0.1 0.7 0.8
Chad 3 4 24 21 2.6 0.2 0.3
Congo 3 7 28 1.1 1.6 2.9
C’te d'Ivoire 14 37 104 154 4.0 9.6 13.3
Gambia 36 82 118 320 28.2 46.2 54.9
Ghana 33 63 160 20.3 35.4 36.3
Kenya 17 40 74 118 4.5 9.8 12.1
Lesotho 32 59 153 .. 9.1 17.5
Madagascar 10 20 65 87 6.0 17.4 18.1
Malawi 34 79 108 137 8.0 20.2 24.7
Mali 4 7 10 12 1.3 1.5 4.9
Mauritania 1 2 7 0.0 0.7 0.8
Mozambique 10 18 45 2.7 4.9 6.3
Niger 3 6 6 15 0.4 2.1 3.2
Nigeria 53 104 61 124 16.7 33.0 34.0
Senegal 18 37 80 78 10.9 17.9 20.8
Sierra Leone 34 58 100 120 14.4 16.8 21.1
South Africa 16 31 107 151 27.1 38.2 42.2
Sudan 5 10 4 0.1 1.3 1.4
Tanzania 12 27 18 93 3.8 3.8 4.0
Uganda 34 71 122 144 11.1 19.4 12.1
Zaire 7 16 65 0.9 1.0 1.2
Zambia 5 11 46 52 3.9 7.5 8.3
Zimbabwe 11 25 205 203 21.9 30.5 33.3
Africa (median) 12 26 65 82 3.8 7.8 8.9
Asia (median) 91 172 141 184 34.4 62.3 81.2
Bangladesh 405 751 108 27.7 32.9 50.8
China 75 119 111 .. .. ..
India 151 257 286 550 109.2 209.9 255.5
Indonesia 56 94 47 147 11.6 31.2 64.3
Korea, Rep. 288 433 349 565 36.6 157.9 346.9
Malaysia 29 54 46 122 46.7 62.3 84.4
Pakistan 72 142 96 222 32.1 49.3 112.6
Philippines 107 203 187 527 52.0 92.7 74.6
Sri Lanka 170 263 312 402 .. 273.9 ..
Thailand 60 108 24 141 18.9 46.2 78.1
Notes:  1.  Road and Paved Road Density are measured in km per thousand square km.  Population density is per sq. km.
Source:  World Bank, World Tables
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Table 7:  Growth and Variability in Cereal Yields in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1961-1996
Yield (kg/ha) Trend Growth Rates Annual Variation
average average
1961-65 1990-95 1961-75 1975-95 1961-71 1971-81 1981-95
Benin 5.2 9.3 2.2 1.7 6.1 8.2 10.2
Botswana 3.3 2.9 2.3 -1.0 86.7 92.4 38.4
Burkina Faso 4.7 7.9 0.5 2.4 16.5 8.9 13.3
Cameroun 7.9 12.2 1.0 2.2 6.5 10.0 8.9
Central African Rep 6.0 9.0 0.6 3.8 11.6 12.4 14.8
Chad 6.2 6.2 -0.5 0.8 15.8 16.2 21.5
Congo 8.6 9.2 -1.1 2.2 16.6 21.2 14.2
C’te d'Ivoire 7.4 10.0 1.5 1.5 9.4 11.3 10.6
Gambia 10.5 11.2 0.0 0.6 4.9 12.5 8.9
Ghana 8.0 12.2 0.6 2.8 11.9 9.5 20.5
Kenya 12.2 16.4 0.7 0.9 5.2 9.9 16.2
Lesotho 8.1 10.0 -2.3 0.1 5.6 39.4 34.1
Madagascar 17.7 19.4 0.2 0.9 4.6 4.2 3.5
Malawi 9.6 10.4 1.0 -0.9 23.0 10.5 44.2
Mali 7.3 8.0 0.8 0.1 8.6 23.8 15.8
Mauritania 3.7 7.8 -2.3 4.6 17.1 28.6 17.1
Mozambique 9.0 4.5 -1.2 -3.0 5.6 15.4 38.7
Niger 5.4 3.1 -3.4 -1.7 19.6 14.1 30.7
Nigeria 7.4 11.4 0.9 0.9 9.4 21.2 13.3
Senegal 5.7 8.1 0.5 1.4 25.2 36.7 20.0
Sierra Leone 12.0 12.0 1.7 -0.9 12.2 5.8 10.2
South Africa 10.6 17.0 3.8 -0.2 27.3 28.4 40.3
Sudan 8.2 5.5 -2.1 -1.4 20.2 14.5 37.1
Tanzania 8.4 12.6 -0.3 1.2 13.3 16.8 14.9
Uganda 9.1 15.2 2.9 0.9 10.9 15.0 18.6
Zaire 6.8 7.9 0.8 0.2 5.5 3.0 2.5
Zambia 8.0 14.6 1.9 -0.1 14.4 14.4 42.8
Zimbabwe 8.8 11.4 3.7 -1.7 20.0 28.6 67.4
Africa (median) 8.0 10.0 0.7 0.8 12.0 14.5 16.7
Asia (median) 15.3 28.1 2.2 2.0 7.1 5.6 4.5
Bangladesh 16.6 25.8 0.4 2.0 7.1 6.5 4.5
China 14.9 44.4 4.5 3.2 4.8 4.7 3.9
India 9.4 20.4 2.0 3.0 7.4 8.2 4.9
Indonesia 15.3 38.5 3.5 2.7 5.4 3.4 3.1
Korea, Rep. 30.4 58.3 2.8 1.1 10.1 14.1 8.1
Malaysia 20.9 30.1 2.2 0.7 5.4 5.6 4.1
Pakistan 8.7 18.8 4.1 1.6 7.6 3.7 6.4
Philippines 10.3 21.6 1.9 2.5 6.3 5.1 4.4
Sri Lanka 18.2 28.1 0.4 1.9 10.0 6.9 12.7
Thailand 17.8 22.7 0.7 2.0 4.9 10.4 5.6
Afeica (mean) 8.1 10.2 0.5 0.7 15.5 19.0 22.5
Asia (mean) 16.3 30.9 2.2 2.1 6.9 6.9 5.8
t-Test for difference
between the Means -3.89 -5.08 -3.03 -3.39 2.84 3.53 5.47
Notes:  1.  Annual variation in yields is measured as the standard deviation of annual growth rates.
Source:  FAOSTAT
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Table 8:  Growth and Variability in Coarse Grain Yields in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1961-1996
Yield (kg/ha) Trend Growth Rates Annual Variation
average average
1961-65 1990-95 1961-75 1975-95 1961-71 1971-81 1981-95
Benin 5.2 9.2 2.0 1.8 6.2 8.2 10.1
Botswana 3.3 2.8 2.4 -0.9 87.9 94.3 40.5
Burkina Faso 4.7 7.8 0.4 2.5 17.1 9.3 13.6
Cameroun 7.9 11.5 1.0 2.0 7.0 10.7 10.2
Central African Rep 5.9 8.7 0.6 4.1 11.7 14.5 16.0
Chad 6.0 5.8 -0.7 0.6 15.9 17.0 20.7
Congo 9.0 9.2 -3.3 2.8 28.8 25.1 17.3
C’te d'Ivoire 6.4 7.4 -0.2 1.8 12.7 17.0 8.1
Gambia 9.5 10.6 -0.2 1.1 6.3 15.2 13.0
Ghana 7.8 11.7 0.7 2.6 13.1 9.8 22.4
Kenya 12.2 16.2 0.5 1.1 5.9 10.9 16.4
Lesotho 8.1 10.3 -1.9 0.5 7.5 39.7 32.3
Madagascar 11.5 9.2 -1.4 -0.6 7.1 7.1 7.5
Malawi 9.7 10.3 0.8 -0.8 23.4 11.3 44.9
Mali 6.9 7.1 1.0 -0.2 10.1 25.4 16.3
Mauritania 3.7 5.3 -2.8 3.3 17.5 30.8 20.1
Mozambique 8.4 4.3 -1.5 -3.1 6.5 20.4 40.8
Niger 5.3 3.0 -3.6 -1.8 20.2 15.6 32.0
Nigeria 7.3 10.7 0.7 0.8 9.2 21.8 14.6
Senegal 5.1 7.1 0.8 1.1 24.6 35.5 22.9
Sierra Leone 9.9 7.7 0.6 -2.6 4.8 5.2 9.8
South Africa 11.5 17.4 3.8 -1.0 30.8 35.4 50.7
Sudan 8.1 4.8 -2.3 -1.8 21.3 13.9 40.6
Tanzania 8.0 12.0 -0.8 1.1 13.8 18.7 16.9
Uganda 9.0 15.2 2.9 0.9 11.1 15.3 18.8
Zaire 6.7 8.0 0.9 0.4 4.8 3.6 2.7
Zambia 8.0 14.3 1.9 -0.2 14.4 14.5 45.1
Zimbabwe 8.8 10.4 3.4 -1.9 20.6 30.5 69.7
Africa (median) 7.9 9.2 0.6 0.7 12.9 15.4 18.1
Asia (median) 7.6 14.1 1.4 2.2 10.4 7.5 6.9
Bangladesh 7.1 7.1 0.1 0.3 8.7 7.4 11.0
China 11.2 40.8 4.8 3.7 7.0 6.9 6.1
India 5.3 9.2 1.4 1.8 10.5 9.0 13.1
Indonesia 9.7 21.9 1.2 3.5 7.6 2.1 2.5
Korea, Rep. 18.1 37.5 4.3 1.3 21.3 22.9 6.9
Malaysia 13.2 17.7 3.9 2.2 20.0 26.0 6.7
Pakistan 6.3 9.8 1.8 1.3 5.2 4.4 5.6
Philippines 6.6 14.1 2.3 2.9 3.6 3.3 3.6
Sri Lanka 7.2 9.5 -0.9 2.2 19.7 7.5 10.5
Thailand 19.8 26.7 0.7 3.0 10.4 24.9 9.6
Afeica (mean) 7.6 9.2 0.2 0.5 16.4 20.6 24.1
Asia (mean) 10.5 19.4 1.9 2.2 11.4 11.4 7.6
t-Test for difference
between the Means -1.68 -2.62 -2.50 -3.58 1.36 2.05 5.08
Notes:  1.  Annual variation in yields is measured as the standard deviation of annual growth rates.
Source:  FAOSTAT
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Table 9:  Trends in Value Added Ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-95
V-Ratio (%)(1)
1965-66 1970-71 1975-76 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1994-95
Benin 17.0 13.3 17.2 25.5 27.1 34.7 40.2
Botswana 7.7 12.7 16.6 8.7 5.5 6.9 7.7
Burkina Faso 10.6 4.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.6 5.2
Cameroon 7.7 8.3 10.9 14.5 10.8 15.5 24.3
Central Afr. Rep. 10.0 6.6 9.0 11.1 13.2 16.9 19.7
Chad* 6.4 6.5 8.3 14.3 12.6 13.2 17.8
Congo 12.3 11.3 10.2 8.0 10.1 15.0 16.7
Cote d'Ivoire 15.4 15.2 15.8 19.5 21.5 29.4 30.3
Gambia, The 6.8 7.2 8.6 8.2 8.1 6.6 7.5
Ghana 49.6 54.1 61.7 78.8 56.2 58.6 53.9
Kenya 8.2 7.0 9.0 8.2 9.2 8.6 8.8
Lesotho 11.2 52.3 50.7 41.1 30.7 24.0 17.1
Madagascar 5.2 5.2 8.9 6.9 8.7 11.3 16.3
Malawi 7.8 6.7 6.8 6.6 5.5 5.4 7.2
Mali .. 12.7 15.4 10.4 7.3 9.6 16.5
Mauritania 5.6 7.0 10.4 16.9 17.3 25.5 26.7
Mozambique .. .. .. 10.0 16.3 12.5 11.0
Niger* 10.4 14.9 8.3 6.5 5.2 6.5 7.3
Nigeria 39.7 26.9 27.3 31.0 65.4 66.6 80.9
Senegal 7.0 6.1 9.7 5.4 7.3 8.3 9.0
Sierra Leone 12.2 12.0 20.1 19.4 42.3 37.0 43.6
South Africa 22.9 19.5 27.9 33.8 30.8 33.2 36.2
Sudan 17.3 18.7 19.6 16.7 18.7 17.6 ..
Tanzania 6.8 .. .. 11.6 15.2 18.2 20.5
Uganda 9.4 11.2 26.2 20.8 9.9 13.5 16.1
Zaire 5.9 5.4 8.7 13.3 19.5 .. ..
Zambia 4.4 3.6 4.6 5.6 4.7 7.7 7.2
Zimbabwe* 5.6 5.5 6.7 5.8 7.8 6.6 6.8
Africa (median) 8.8 9.8 10.3 11.3 11.7 13.5 16.6
Asia (median) 27.1 30.7 31.4 26.5 28.2 28.2 27.0
Bangladesh 22.6 26.3 41.5 29.9 32.5 32.7 26.4
China 14.3 14.1 15.2 14.6 13.2 12.5 9.5
India 26.1 28.5 23.7 22.3 20.3 21.8 22.5
Indonesia 49.0 40.5 26.7 21.8 22.9 17.9 17.3
Korea, Rep. 46.3 36.9 42.3 31.5 40.1 42.0 45.3
Malaysia 28.2 33.1 43.9 40.7 49.0 59.7 51.9
Pakistan 37.6 34.1 28.6 23.1 23.9 23.7 27.5
Philippines 25.5 31.4 35.1 30.9 34.3 33.5 38.6
Sri Lanka 30.3 29.9 34.2 32.1 33.1 32.9 29.6
Thailand 11.0 8.6 12.3 12.0 9.2 8.3 7.8
Notes:   (1)  Value added per agricultural worker as a percentage of value added per worker in the non-agricultural sector.
Source:  World Bank, World Development indicators
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Table 10:  Decomposition of the Trends in Value Added Ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-95
Trend Growth Rates in: Trend Growth Rates in:
Labour Productivity Relative Labour Productivity Relative
V-Ratio(1) Agricult. Non-Agr. Price(2) V-Ratio(1) Agricult. Non-Agr. Price(2)
1965-80 1965-80 1965-80 1965-80 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95 1980-95
Benin 7.2 2.2 -4.5 0.6 3.5 2.8 -2.4 -1.7
Botswana 2.5 7.7 2.3 -3.0 -0.9 3.4 2.6 -1.7
Burkina Faso -1.3 -0.9 4.0 3.7 2.0 1.4 1.4 2.1
Cameroon 5.1 3.6 -0.5 1.1 3.9 -0.7 -3.5 1.0
Central Afr. Rep. 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.1 4.2 0.8 -3.6 -0.3
Chad 3.7 -3.9 -6.8 0.8 1.1 2.4 0.9 -0.3
Congo -1.0 1.3 2.0 -0.3 7.1 0.9 -2.7 3.5
Cote d'Ivoire 1.2 2.8 3.4 1.8 4.5 -2.0 -3.4 3.1
Gambia, The 0.5 0.2 1.3 1.5 -2.1 -2.4 -0.9 -0.6
Ghana 4.6 -1.9 -1.8 4.7 -3.3 -1.1 1.9 -0.3
Kenya 1.4 0.9 1.8 2.4 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -0.4
Lesotho -3.4 -1.2 10.4 8.2 -6.0 -2.0 3.3 -0.6
Madagascar 4.4 -1.8 -2.4 3.9 5.7 0.4 -5.6 -0.3
Malawi 0.6 1.1 0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -1.2 -0.5 0.6
Mali -1.9 -1.6 0.5 0.2 2.5 2.5 -7.1 -7.1
Mauritania 7.3 -5.3 -6.9 5.7 3.3 2.3 -4.0 -3.0
Mozambique .. .. .. .. 1.0 0.4 -0.1 0.5
Niger -3.1 -4.7 -2.7 -1.0 -4.6 -1.0 -10.5 -14.1
Nigeria -1.9 1.3 3.4 0.1 5.8 3.2 -2.3 0.3
Senegal 0.6 -1.3 -1.6 0.3 3.3 -0.1 -2.0 1.4
Sierra Leone 3.9 4.8 1.2 0.3 4.3 -0.1 -3.5 0.8
South Africa 2.9 4.7 -0.7 -2.4 0.6 1.6 -2.1 -3.2
Sudan 1.8 0.4 -1.5 0.0 0.1 -2.5 -2.3 0.2
Tanzania .. .. .. .. 4.2 1.9 -2.4 -0.1
Uganda 9.8 .. .. .. 4.3 1.2 -1.7 1.4
Zaire 8.9 -0.3 -4.3 4.9 3.8 0.8 -1.7 1.4
Zambia 2.5 -2.1 -3.4 1.2 3.3 -0.7 -3.1 0.9
Zimbabwe -0.5 -1.6 -2.0 -1.0 1.1 -1.2 -1.9 0.5
Africa (median) 1.6 0.2 -0.5 0.6 2.9 0.4 -2.2 0.1
Asia (median) 0.1 1.3 2.4 1.3 0.0 2.1 2.5 0.8
Bangladesh 3.9 .. .. .. -0.1 1.2 -0.1 -1.3
China -0.6 0.9 4.2 2.8 -3.8 3.3 8.7 1.5
India -1.8 0.2 0.7 -1.3 0.1 2.0 2.7 0.9
Indonesia -5.5 2.7 4.4 -3.7 -1.9 1.0 4.0 1.0
Korea, Rep. -1.0 2.5 6.5 2.9 2.3 6.5 4.9 0.7
Malaysia 2.9 4.1 2.6 1.3 3.0 4.5 2.3 0.8
Pakistan -3.2 -0.6 2.0 -0.6 0.5 2.3 1.8 0.0
Philippines 1.7 1.3 2.3 2.8 1.5 0.1 -2.4 -1.0
Sri Lanka 0.8 1.0 2.4 2.1 -0.3 0.5 1.9 1.0
Thailand 1.8 2.5 1.7 1.1 -3.3 2.4 4.5 -1.2
Notes:   (1)  Value added per agricultural worker as a percentage of value added per worker in the non-agricultural sector.
           (2)  Price effect is calculated as the residual of trend growth rates in other variables.
Source:  World Bank, World Development indicators
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Table 11:   Savings Ratio and Resource Gap in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-94
Saving Ratio Resource Gap
1965-70 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
Benin 1.7 10.0 12.9 .. 6.0 7.3 -9.2 -3.4 -4.9 .. -6.0 -7.9
Botswana -8.7 18.5 9.3 19.8 30.3 30.0 -30.4 -30.3 -27.1 -15.9 6.5 -4.7
Burkina Faso 1.4 24.1 17.6 13.1 19.7 20.9 -8.2 4.1 -5.0 -4.6 -2.0 -0.6
Cameroun 11.3 10.4 14.9 15.7 17.9 13.0 -1.4 -7.1 -10.3 -9.3 -4.7 -3.0
Central African Rep 4.5 15.8 10.0 6.4 9.1 5.4 -15.3 -3.1 -1.7 -2.9 -4.1 -5.8
Chad 9.5 14.1 15.9 -3.0 2.9 -2.2 -6.6 0.2 -4.4 -7.0 -6.0 -11.0
Congo 5.0 12.5 11.5 .. 23.2 4.3 -23.1 -16.9 -18.5 -1.8 0.7 -22.9
C’te d'Ivoire 20.5 20.4 18.8 8.3 7.7 -1.3 0.3 -1.6 -7.3 -12.9 -6.0 -9.7
Gambia 0.6 1.6 6.7 15.0 16.8 24.2 -8.8 -4.8 -12.7 -6.6 -0.4 3.7
Ghana 7.1 10.7 8.7 3.9 5.8 5.9 -5.7 -0.8 -0.2 -0.9 -5.0 -8.8
Kenya 15.5 18.9 16.7 18.0 17.8 16.0 -3.0 -5.5 -6.1 -6.1 -6.6 -3.7
Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 59.6 -0.5 17.6 -9.3 -20.2
Madagascar 2.9 5.3 5.4 4.1 9.3 4.5 -6.2 -4.2 -4.6 -6.3 -1.6 -7.2
Malawi -0.6 11.0 16.1 8.6 6.7 1.1 -16.4 -12.8 -14.5 -11.3 -10.6 -16.2
Mali 6.6 13.3 10.3 8.3 7.1 14.8 -11.3 -3.4 -5.8 -8.1 -13.9 -8.3
Mauritania 22.9 18.4 15.8 7.2 13.4 8.9 3.1 -1.6 -18.6 -26.4 -13.7 -10.7
Mozambique .. .. .. -5.8 -7.0 -3.5 .. .. .. -24.6 -40.1 -57.0
Niger 2.1 7.1 12.4 11.4 15.9 6.9 -6.0 -4.6 -7.1 -6.9 1.7 -0.2
Nigeria 6.8 13.9 23.9 14.2 11.4 .. -6.7 -4.9 -3.0 -3.7 -3.7 ..
Senegal 5.9 13.9 11.8 -4.1 -1.3 3.2 -5.7 -4.1 -4.9 -16.5 -12.8 -10.1
Sierra Leone 8.9 11.7 2.9 3.8 2.6 -1.3 -4.4 -2.5 -10.1 -10.7 -6.9 -13.9
South Africa 26.1 24.6 25.1 23.4 23.0 16.7 -1.9 -4.2 -0.8 -5.0 3.3 0.5
Sudan 11.5 11.5 9.3 7.5 9.2 1.1 -0.7 -1.5 -7.8 -8.8 -3.2 -12.1
Tanzania 16.3 .. .. 17.6 26.4 17.8 0.1 .. .. -5.1 2.5 -15.4
Uganda 12.8 11.3 6.0 -13.0 4.8 3.9 0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -20.2 -5.0 -10.9
Zaire 9.1 11.7 8.5 4.6 5.7 .. -3.1 -5.5 -7.1 -5.1 -8.1 ..
Zambia 38.7 30.1 14.0 3.8 2.9 5.0 10.0 -3.3 -13.0 -13.8 -11.8 -6.5
Zimbabwe 20.4 .. 19.3 15.8 22.8 18.7 1.7 .. 1.7 -3.8 3.6 -5.3
Africa (median) 8.0 12.9 12.4 8.3 9.2 5.9 -5.7 -3.4 -5.9 -6.9 -5.0 -8.6
Asia (median) 14.5 18.8 24.8 23.2 24.6 23.9 -3.1 -1.7 -2.4 -3.9 -1.6 -2.1
Bangladesh .. 6.3 6.0 10.3 7.1 9.7 .. -1.7 -4.1 -4.0 -5.6 -3.5
China .. 29.1 32.7 34.7 35.3 39.1 .. 0.6 0.2 0.9 -1.6 1.4
India 14.5 17.2 21.7 20.4 20.8 21.7 -2.0 -0.9 0.3 -1.8 -2.8 -1.6
Indonesia 6.5 20.1 25.8 27.3 24.7 28.6 -2.7 0.8 1.4 0.0 -3.0 -2.1
Korea, Rep. 16.2 18.8 24.8 24.2 34.6 35.6 -7.0 -6.4 -4.5 -5.7 4.0 -1.1
Malaysia 21.4 23.0 28.4 26.5 28.5 30.5 1.9 -1.9 2.4 -8.3 2.3 -5.1
Pakistan 12.0 10.4 11.9 21.3 24.6 23.9 -5.4 -4.0 -5.8 2.6 6.0 4.3
Philippines 17.1 24.5 28.0 23.2 19.4 20.1 -3.5 2.1 -3.6 -3.9 1.6 -2.7
Sri Lanka 9.1 12.9 16.0 20.7 19.2 20.0 .. -3.6 -2.4 -8.7 -3.6 -4.4
Thailand 21.6 23.5 21.7 23.2 27.9 34.1 -1.7 -1.5 -4.9 -5.8 -2.0 -7.0
Afeica (mean) 10.0 14.2 13.0 8.2 11.5 8.8 -6.1 -2.5 -7.5 -8.4 -5.8 -10.3
Asia (mean) 14.8 18.6 21.7 23.2 24.2 26.3 -2.9 -1.7 -2.1 -3.5 -0.5 -2.2
t-Test for difference
between the Means -1.94 -1.75 -3.10 -5.84 -4.08 -5.31 -1.81 -0.31 -3.50 -2.52 -2.72 -3.50
Notes: 1.  Savings ratio is national savings as a ratio of GDP.  2-  Resource gap is savings ratio minus gross investment ratio.
             3.  Savings for Zimbabwe refers to gross domestic savings.
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Table 12:  Per Capita GDP and Share of Exports in GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-90
Per Capita GDP Exports as % of GDP
1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-92 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
Benin 89 88 84 88 80 74 14.1 22.2 22.7 25.8 27.2 23.6
Botswana 56 86 125 159 187 .. 26.0 34.5 45.4 56.3 69.3 53.7
Burkina Faso 31 31 35 38 41 41 7.3 8.9 11.0 12.5 12.3 ..
Cameroun 59 66 78 106 110 89 22.8 23.1 23.2 28.3 21.9 22.3
Central African Rep 55 58 59 51 47 44 27.3 25.1 24.5 24.5 19.2 16.2
Chad 56 51 48 32 31 33 20.4 22.6 23.0 20.1 19.7 13.7
Congo 103 135 140 192 192 181 32.3 36.1 45.5 58.3 46.3 35.3
C’te d'Ivoire 58 66 80 67 64 63 37.1 36.6 37.9 39.1 35.8 36.6
Gambia 74 80 75 67 65 73 38.0 37.3 39.4 46.4 51.9 59.1
Ghana 58 63 67 76 92 100 18.4 19.5 12.3 6.5 15.9 18.6
Kenya 52 62 69 67 70 72 30.2 29.3 30.0 25.9 23.9 32.1
Lesotho 37 47 72 80 78 77 12.0 13.7 16.2 15.3 13.6 13.2
Madagascar 89 87 76 66 56 51 17.2 15.6 15.4 11.9 15.3 17.8
Malawi 35 39 42 41 40 41 22.8 26.0 26.8 24.4 23.5 23.1
Mali 33 34 40 41 42 41 .. 12.1 12.7 18.0 17.2 17.5
Mauritania 68 71 77 70 64 64 40.7 46.5 35.9 46.2 52.5 43.7
Mozambique 110 118 85 69 61 59 .. .. .. 13.5 11.7 21.1
Niger 58 56 51 52 43 .. 9.7 14.1 22.8 22.4 19.6 12.2
Nigeria 47 84 110 103 77 80 10.4 14.9 22.5 18.7 26.8 35.6
Senegal 90 88 91 92 92 90 24.9 31.9 34.7 32.5 25.9 26.4
Sierra Leone 91 97 91 84 71 68 28.7 29.8 24.7 15.5 13.9 21.9
South Africa 228 272 273 277 263 252 25.2 25.3 32.1 29.3 29.2 24.0
Sudan 72 68 77 73 63 58 15.0 15.0 10.4 9.8 6.1 ..
Tanzania 32 37 40 37 41 .. 26.0 24.2 17.2 9.2 13.5 ..
Uganda 51 51 46 61 42 44 .. .. .. 12.0 8.1 6.2
Zaire 48 53 43 37 36 .. 19.3 13.1 12.3 18.8 .. ..
Zambia 86 93 85 72 60 55 52.5 46.0 39.9 33.7 35.9 31.3
Zimbabwe .. 98 96 101 93 95 .. 4.9 28.8 25.7 30.0 34.7
Africa (median) 58.2 67.1 76.6 69.3 64.4 66.1 23.9 23.6 23.9 23.4 21.9 23.4
Asia (median) 100.0 109.5 127.3 137.6 135.1 149.1 10.4 19.5 21.2 22.9 23.7 26.8
Bangladesh 93 78 81 90 103 116 9.0 5.6 5.3 6.8 7.6 10.3
China 48 58 65 84 103 111 3.6 4.1 6.7 11.5 15.8 22.6
India 51 65 87 120 140 162 4.1 4.5 6.7 6.3 6.7 10.0
Indonesia 117 136 163 133 114 92 .. 19.5 25.9 26.5 23.7 26.8
Korea, Rep. 104 158 227 286 427 552 11.7 22.3 30.5 34.8 35.5 28.8
Malaysia 144 195 253 329 343 435 41.1 40.9 50.7 53.5 65.4 81.5
Pakistan 75 75 80 92 106 112 8.3 10.2 10.5 11.9 13.2 16.3
Philippines 105 120 140 142 130 136 16.9 22.1 21.2 22.9 26.9 30.4
Sri Lanka 96 99 115 145 163 172 30.4 25.1 31.8 28.3 26.0 31.4
Thailand 104 126 155 184 231 297 16.4 17.9 20.9 22.7 29.9 36.3
Afeica (mean) 69.1 77.8 80.6 82.0 78.7 76.9 24.1 24.2 25.7 25.0 25.4 26.7
Asia (mean) 93.7 110.9 136.5 160.5 186.0 218.5 15.7 17.2 21.0 22.5 25.1 29.4
t-Test for difference
between the Means -2.11 -2.03 -2.54 -2.78 -2.88 -2.78 1.88 1.67 0.93 0.48 0.06 -0.41
Notes:  1.  Per Capita GDP is measured in 1985 world prices in US dollar, Asian median 1965-69=100.
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Table 13:  Terms of Trade Effect, Manufacturing Exports and Debt Ratios in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, 1965-93
Manufacturing Export Debt/GNP Debt Service
Terms of Trade Effect as Percentage of Exports Shares Ratio Export Ratio
1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-93 1970-75 1980-85 1990-93 1990 1990
Benin -0.5 -14.9 -15.9 3.8 -0.6 9.2 7.9 .. 67.8 7.7
Botswana 3.1 -21.5 -9.7 -2.3 27.1 .. .. .. 18.7 4.7
Burkina Faso -6.5 -7.7 -6.0 1.2 -0.2 5.5 15.3 30.2 32.5 6.8
Cameroun 26.9 -12.1 14.9 -31.7 -32.1 9.7 5.2 13.4 56.7 19.3
Central African Rep 6.1 -6.6 17.0 -6.7 -14.5 34.5 23.3 20.8 56.0 13.3
Chad -1.5 13.8 -2.1 13.0 2.9 6.5 7.8 .. 43.2 4.5
Congo -6.8 36.2 22.0 6.2 -48.3 20.3 5.1 12.5 201.9 35.3
C’te d'Ivoire 19.9 -3.8 14.0 -19.6 -26.9 8.9 9.4 17.0 188.5 34.1
Gambia 3.5 -4.4 -20.0 12.5 -18.3 0.2 10.2 32.8 112.3 20.4
Ghana 35.4 -4.7 11.0 -76.4 -35.8 1.0 5.2 23.4 62.1 35.9
Kenya -9.0 3.8 8.0 -10.5 -48.0 13.4 12.6 30.1 88.1 36.4
Lesotho .. .. .. .. .. 37.7 4.2
Madagascar 4.3 -1.7 4.0 2.4 -39.2 5.6 8.3 17.4 145.0 49.1
Malawi 3.4 -2.3 -18.0 3.6 -10.8 4.4 6.5 6.3 90.0 23.7
Mali -0.6 -5.1 -2.0 10.3 2.0 11.1 7.9 1.6 101.2 11.5
Mauritania -11.0 -18.4 -15.0 -4.2 -3.1 2.4 1.4 1.5 223.1 30.5
Mozambique 4.2 6.8 -6.9 -8.0 7.3 8.0 2.3 20.3 388.6 18.8
Niger -4.5 -12.6 -15.0 -26.4 7.4 6.3 2.1 .. 75.1 25.2
Nigeria 10.2 33.3 27.0 -7.0 -68.9 0.9 0.7 2.4 118.5 22.8
Senegal 9.0 19.6 -31.1 2.6 -0.3 16.9 15.8 21.8 68.2 20.5
Sierra Leone 4.1 -11.9 -2.0 -4.3 -16.9 58.6 37.3 27.7 149.5 7.5
South Africa -1.5 -8.6 -14.6 -10.1 2.5 22.7 20.3 40.3 .. ..
Sudan 7.3 7.6 -9.0 -10.3 -11.3 0.2 2.9 1.7 175.3 5.9
Tanzania 0.1 1.8 0.0 -14.2 -41.4 12.4 13.9 .. 288.8 42.6
Uganda 15.7 -15.1 19.0 -6.3 -111.5 0.4 1.9 0.8 62.6 57.8
Zaire 39.2 -40.1 1.9 -13.2 -17.9 7.4 22.8 19.0 .. 15.1
Zambia 41.7 -60.7 -4.0 -35.8 -3.8 0.5 1.4 .. 240.7 15.1
Zimbabwe -9.6 -12.4 -6.1 -23.0 -13.6 27.6 37.2 27.8 50.2 23.1
Africa (median) 3.5 -5.1 -2.1 -6.7 -13.6 7.7 7.9 19.0 89.0 20.4
Asia (median) -4.1 -2.4 1.0 -5.0 -9.1 43.1 48.1 72.7 49.3 23.2
Bangladesh -9.5 -25.2 7.0 4.9 -26.7 59.1 64.0 76.7 54.9 28.5
China 11.6 -2.4 4.0 -6.2 -3.1 43.1 48.1 78.7 14.8 11.5
India -4.1 -2.8 -20.0 -5.0 7.4 48.4 56.5 72.7 27.8 30.5
Indonesia -3.3 31.0 18.0 -1.3 -64.9 1.3 6.9 41.1 66.1 30.9
Korea, Rep. 8.8 1.8 -13.0 0.1 6.9 80.1 90.6 93.2 13.9 10.7
Malaysia -19.2 6.9 17.0 -24.6 -19.3 12.6 23.2 60.0 39.3 10.3
Pakistan -5.1 -2.8 -19.1 -9.3 -9.1 79.3 55.4 77.8 49.3 23.2
Philippines 13.9 2.1 -30.9 -17.5 10.7 13.0 47.0 70.9 68.7 27.2
Sri Lanka -19.2 -4.4 1.0 -1.5 -16.9 5.9 23.0 63.6 73.3 14.0
Thailand -11.6 3.9 -10.0 -23.4 1.6 13.1 33.5 66.2 33.4 16.9
Afeica (mean) 6.8 -5.3 -1.4 -9.4 -19.0 11.3 10.9 17.6 120.9 21.9
Asia (mean) -3.8 0.8 -4.6 -8.4 -11.3 35.6 44.8 70.1 44.1 20.4
t-Test for difference
between the Means 2.28 -1.08 0.54 -0.22 -0.87 -2.44 -4.26 -9.87 4.28 0.41
Notes:  1.  Terms of Trade Effect is measured as X(1/pm - 1/px) where X is the value of terminal year exports and 
              Pm and Px are import and export price indexes.  The values shown are % of terminal year exports.
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Figure 1: Real Wage and Real GDP per Worker Indices for 
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